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THE ENIGMA OF ENGINEERING’S INDUSTRIAL
EXEMPTION TO LICENSURE:
THE EXCEPTION THAT SWALLOWED A
PROFESSION
Paul M. Spinden*
I. INTRODUCTION
A license has become almost as common for workers in the United States
as goldbricking.1 Nearly a third of America’s workers must have some form of
government-issued license to do their jobs.2 This number is almost seven times
higher than it was just fifty years ago3 and is a striking shift from a time before
the Civil War when anyone could engage in virtually any occupation or
profession without a license.4 Today, every state requires some form of licensing
for an average of ninety-two occupations.5 With so many occupations involved,
anomalies are bound to emerge. Morris Kleiner offers these examples:
In Minnesota, more classroom time is required to become a
cosmetologist than to become a lawyer. Becoming a manicurist takes
double the number of hours of instruction as a paramedic. In
Louisiana, the only state in the country that requires licenses for
florists, monks were until recently forbidden to sell coffins because
they were not licensed funeral directors.6

*

LL.M., University of Virginia (1998); J.D., University of Missouri-Kansas City (1979); M.A.,
American history, Missouri State University (1976). Spinden is associate professor at Liberty
University School of Law where he teaches administrative law, contracts, and criminal law. He
served as judge on the Missouri Court of Appeals, 1991-2008. He acknowledges with much
gratitude the excellent research assistance of Ms. Melanie Migliaccio and his wife, Sara Spinden.
1 American workers average “stealing” about 3½ hours a week from their employers at a cost of
about $137 billion a year. Bosses: Goldbricking Costs Firms $137B, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 17,
1983, at 18.
2 Morris M. Kleiner, Op-Ed., Why License a Florist?, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2014, at A35. Focus of
this article is on the most demanding form of licensing, referred to as “license,” “licensure,” or
“licensing.” Government typically uses it to license persons who pass an examination and satisfy
education, experience, and character requirements. Less demanding forms of licensing include
certification, in which authorization is granted after verification of persons’ education or expertise
in that field and does not preclude others from practicing the occupation, and registration, in which
a person merely declares that he or she is practicing, provides contact information and pays a fee.
3 During the 1950s, about 4.5% of the American workforce worked on jobs requiring a license.
Morris M. Kleiner, A License for Protection: Why are States Regulating More and More
Occupations?, 29 REG. 17, 17 (2006).
4 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLATION IN THE STATES 19 (1952).
5 Adam B. Summers, Occupational Licensing: Ranking the States and Exploring Alternatives,
REASON FOUND. 5 (2007), http://reason.org/files/762c8fe96431b6fa5e27ca64eaa1818b.pdf. “The
most regulated state in the nation is California, which requires licenses for 177 job categories . . . .”
Id.
6 Kleiner, supra note 2.
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While amusing, these anomalies are a reminder that occupational
licensing7 can be duplicitous. Its proponents typically defend it as necessary for
protecting the public from incompetents and charlatans, but the Council of State
Governments used an old joke to make the important point that licensing also can
be motivated by the self-interest:
Not long ago the Governor of a midwestern state was
approached by representatives of a particular trade anxious to enlist the
Governor’s support in securing passage of legislation to license their
trade.
“Governor,” the men said, “passage of this licensing act will
ensure that only qualified people will practice this occupation; it will
eliminate charlatans, incompetents or frauds; and it will thereby protect
the safety and welfare of the people of this state.”
The Governor, from long experience, was somewhat skeptical.
“Gentlemen,” he asked, “are you concerned with advancing the health,
safety and welfare of the people under the police powers of this state,
or are you primarily interested in creating a monopoly situation to
eliminate competition and raise prices?”
The spokesman for the occupational group smiled and said,
“Governor, we’re interested in a little of each.”8

The joke’s punch-line highlights the significant economic and social benefits that
result from attaching a mandatory license to an occupation.9
Even with monetary benefits to be reaped from licensing, American
engineers have been surprisingly ambivalent toward licensing, if not outright
rejecting of it. In a striking enigma, an overwhelming majority of engineers—
somewhere around eighty percent10—do not pursue licensing as a professional

7

The term “occupational licensing” includes licensing of the professions, such as law and
medicine, and occupation groups, such as barbers.
8 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 4, at 1.
9 Kleiner, in a study conducted with Alan B. Krueger, concluded that requiring a licensing for an
occupation can increase salaries by as much as fifteen percent. Kleiner, supra note 2. For a survey
of literature on the issue of occupational licensing’s economic benefits, see REED NEIL OLSEN, The
Regulation of Medical Professions, in 5870 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF L. & ECON. 1018-54 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert et al. eds., 2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/58
70book.pdf.
10 This figure represents a consensus. See, e.g., M. J. Kolhoff, For the Industry Exemption . . ., in
ENGINEERING PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICS 526, 526-27 (James H. Schaub et al. eds., 1983); Craig
Musselman, The 80% Myth in the Engineering Profession, NAT’L SOC’Y PROF. ENGINEERS (Sept.
13, 2010), http://community.nspe.org/blogs/licensing/archive/2010/09/13/the-80-myth-in-theengineering-profession.aspx. In 2001, the California Society of Professional Engineers published a
1995 estimate prepared by the National Council of Examiners of Engineering and Surveying
(NCEES) that reported approximately 2.2 million engineers practicing in the United States and that
approximately 400,000 of them, or eighteen percent, were licensed. An Introduction to
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engineer.11 But even more befuddling is why the states, every one of which
requires a license to practice engineering,12 allow the lion’s share of engineering
to be done by unlicensed persons, especially in light of the state’s assertion that
engineering licenses are necessary for the public’s protection.13 Every state
exempts from licensure engineers whose practices fit within one or more of five
categories: (1) engineers working under the supervision of a licensed engineer
who takes responsibility for the unlicensed engineer’s work; (2) engineers
employed by public utilities; (3) engineers employed by the federal government;
(4) engineers employed by a state government; and (5) “in-house” engineers
employed by a manufacturing or other business firm (known as the “industrial
exemption”).14
The policy underlying these exemptions, especially the industrial
exemption, is perplexing. It begs the question of how an engineer’s working for
an industrial firm protects the public and makes licensing unnecessary. No state
exempts a lawyer or physician from licensure simply because he or she is
employed by the government or a corporation. How does a state justify requiring
a florist to have a license, no matter where he or she works,15 but does not require

Professional Engineering Licensing in California and Other States, CAL. SOC’Y PROF. ENGINEERS 3
(2001), http://www.cspe.com/GovtAffairs/TitleActStudy.pdf. The engineering specialty in which
the largest number of practitioners were licensed, according to the NCEES statistics, was civil
engineering. Id. Forty-four percent of civil engineers were licensed. Id. In the other engineering
specialties, twenty-three percent of mechanical engineers were licensed; nine percent of electrical
engineers; eight percent of chemical engineers; eight percent of industrial engineers; thirteen
percent of agricultural engineers; and seventeen percent of mining and metallurgical engineers. Id.
11 The designation “professional engineer” in the profession refers to those engineers who have
obtained licensure. See Karen Chassie, The PE License: Certifying Competence, IEEE
POTENTIALS, Aug./Sept. 2001, at 14.
12 “Engineering” is defined variously by the states. They typically define it very broadly as
providing, for remuneration, any service or creative work that entails application of engineering
principles and principles of mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences. The definition
applied by state governments in regulating engineers typically employ a much broader, allencompassing definition.
13 For example, the New Hampshire Board of Professional Engineers asserts on its website that the
board’s purpose is “to regulate the practice of Professional Engineering in this State to safeguard
life, health, property, and to promote public welfare.” Welcome to the NH Board of Professional
Engineers, ST. N. H. BOARD PROF. ENGINEERS, http://www.nh.gov/jtboard/pe.htm (last visited Oct.
13, 2014). The Kentucky Board of Engineers and Land Surveyors asserts on its website that the
state’s engineering licensing law was enacted in 1938 “to protect the public health, safety, and
welfare.”
About Us, KY. BOARD ENGINEERS & LAND SURVEYORS (2012),
http://kyboels.ky.gov/Pages/default.aspx.
14 See Demonstrating Qualifying Engineering Expereince for Licensure, Nat’l Soc’y prof.
Engineers, (July 28, 2007), http://www.nspe.org/resources/licensure/resources/demonstratingqualifying-engineering-experience-licensure.
15 Since 1936, Louisiana has required florists to be licensed. Dick M. Carpenter II, Testing the
Utility of Licensing: Evidence from a Field Experiment on Occupational Regulation, 13 J. APPLIED
BUS. & ECON. 28, 30 (2012). The requirement is set out in LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3808 (2014).
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an engineer, whose negligence can kill,16 to obtain a license simply because he or
she works for an industrial firm?
As incompatible with protecting the public as the industrial exemption
seems to be, the courts have made clear that the states are free to persist in such
policies. In such matters as licensing, the states have virtually unfettered
discretion. The United States Supreme Court has declared that regulatory
licensing is one the government’s strongest powers to be wielded as it deems
necessary for protecting society.17
Even if the policy of the exemptions does not violate due process rights,
it is difficult to defend as good government. Indeed, the exemptions raise
suspicions that their enactment had more to do with politics—protecting the
private interests of industrial firms and others—than with good government.18
Unlike any other profession, engineering has always been dominated by large
industrial interests, which often have much political power.19 Although engineers
provided the genius and ingenuity for America’s industrialization, they did so as
employees of business entities and entrepreneurs. Little has changed. As Edwin
Layton observed, engineering has always involved an attempt—with mixed
success—to blend science and business. “[T]he test of an engineer’s work,” he
said, “lies not in the laboratory, but in the marketplace.”20 Engineers’ success has
always been tied to industry’s success,21 and today the overwhelming majority of
engineers—as many as ninety percent22—work for large manufacturing

In 2010, the legislature abolished the four-hour subjectively-judged demonstration section of the
floral exam, but a written exam still is required. Jacob Sullum, A Victory for Floral Freedom in
Louisiana, REASON.COM (July 12, 2010, 12:52 PM), http://www.reason.com/blog/2010/07/12/avictory-for-floral-freedom-i.
16 Doug McGuirt notes two major disasters attributed to “engineering oversights” that motivated
legislators to enact engineering licensing laws. Doug McGuirt, The Professional Engineering
Century, NAT’L SOC’Y PROF. ENGINEERS (June 2007), at 24-29. These disasters were the 1928
collapse of the St. Francis Dam near Los Angeles that killed more than 500 persons and the 1937
school explosion in New London, Texas, that killed about 300 persons. Id.
17 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
18 See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3
(1971) (“The state—the machinery and power of the state—is a potential resource or threat to every
industry in the society. With its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give money, the state can
and does selectively help or hurt a vast number of industries.”) (emphasis added).
19 EDWIN T. LAYTON, JR., THE REVOLT OF THE ENGINEERS: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
AMERICAN ENGINEERING PROFESSION ch. 1 (1986). Only large organizations could take advantage
of engineers’ knowledge of science because “large works are more likely to involve complexities
than are small ones; and the larger the project, the more likely it is that such difficulties will
transcend the capabilities of artisans and businessmen.” Id. at 2.
20 Id. at 1.
21 ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR
156 (1988).
22 Carl Nelson & Susan Peterson, Ethical Decisions for Engineers: Systematic Avoidance and the
Need for Confrontation, in ENGINEERING PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICS 330, 334 (James H. Schaub

2015]

ENIGMA OF ENGINEERING

641

businesses, exempting them from licensure in states recognizing an industrial
exemption.23
This article probes the soundness of the policy underlying the industrial
exemption. It concludes that, although emergence of the exemption was a natural
consequence of engineering’s close alliance from the very start with big business,
the exemption has thwarted engineering’s development as a bona fide profession.
It also concludes that only with elimination or a significant reengineering of the
exemption can the profession truly expect to attain profession status. Such a
rethinking about the exemption will come only with a major change in attitude by
engineering practitioners as to what it means to be an engineer.
The article begins its probe in Part II with a brief history of engineering
licensing. This section identifies the primary factors that spurred the sudden
push for engineering licensing at the beginning of the 20th Century and concludes
that it resulted from two major instigators. One was the Progressive reform
movement, which pushed for bureaucratic regulation as the solution to the
dangers emerging from the nation’s rapid industrialization and urbanization. The
Progressives sought licensing as a means for protecting the public from
incompetents and charlatans. The other motivating force was an awakening by
some engineering leaders to the economic benefits to be reaped from licensure.
Finally, the section traces the backlash by industry, engineering’s close partner,
to licensing that resulted in the industrial exemption. Part III focuses on the
policy and rationale underlying the industrial exemption. It considers the defense
of the industrial exemption articulated by an engineer working in industry, M. J.
Kolhoff, and rejects his arguments as untenable, resting politics and monetary
self-interest of powerful business firms that employed large contingencies of
engineers. Moreover, it concludes that the exemption has been a significant
factor, coupled with lack of control of engineering by engineers in industry, for
relegating engineering to a mere occupation group status. Finally, Part IV
endeavors to show that the industrial exemption is dangerous to engineering
because it facilitates business-controlled engineering, which has been a
significant factor in some major disasters and failures, including the 1986
Challenger disaster and the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. It also
asserts that the industrial exemption is dangerous for engineering because it has
necessarily meant engineers’ loss of control of industrial engineering and has
contributed to a change in attitude concerning personal responsibilities. If
engineering is ever to achieve profession status, the root cause of its relegation to
a mere occupation group, the industrial exemption must be eliminated or
significantly pared.

et al., eds., 1983); see also ROBERT J. BAUM, ETHICS AND ENGINEERING CURRICULA 15 (1980).
Elliott Krause puts the number at eighty-five percent. ELLIOTT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS:
PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THE PRESENT 61 (1999).
23 Eligibility for an exemption can depend on the exemption statute’s wording.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ENGINEERING LICENSURE IN THE
UNITED STATES
Occupational licensing in general did not become a significant facet of
American society until the closing years of the 19th Century.24 Before then, only
practitioners of the “learned professions” of law and medicine required a
government-issued license.25 By the years before the Civil War, when engineers
were just beginning to emerge as an occupation group, licensing had lost much of
its significance. Not only did licensing seem inconsistent with the Jacksonian
democracy ideals that dominated early 19th Century thought, but the Civil War
shook the nation into a reconsideration of its basic institutions—even rethinking
what it meant to be a nation. Norman Spaulding explained that this national
introspection caused the professions, even the most highly respected practice of
law, to retreat “to organizational structures that provided collective, less directly
political, venues in which to secure professional authority.”26 In the respite of the
post-war years, the occupations, even law and medicine, were wide open to most
anyone.
During this time, the nation’s industrialization gave rise to the
forerunners of today’s engineers. From the beginning—and it has never
changed—engineering was closely tied to industrial interests. Engineering
emerged in the 19th Century in response to industry’s call for scientific
knowledge in the development of steamboats, steam engines, locomotives,
canals, and the like.27 The first engineers were a tiny cadre of experts who
practiced what was then called the “mechanics arts,” which involved applying
scientific principles to industrial products.28 These experts worked almost
exclusively as employees of large-scale business organizations and the military.29
Large outfits were the only ones that could afford to employ them. Small firms
did not have the resources to deal in the products that needed their expertise.30
Engineering’s close alliance with big business became a persistent theme of the
profession that endures today.

24 COUNCIL OF STATE

GOV’TS, supra note 4, at 16-17.
Douglas A. Wallace, Occupational Licensing and Certification: Remedies for Denial, 14 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 46, 46 (1972).
26 Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Politics and Professionalism
During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2001, 2094 (2005). Spaulding
asserts that the nation’s constitutional crisis spilled over into a question of even law’s legitimacy,
causing a retreat of the venerable legal profession. Id.
27 Bruce Sinclair, Episodes in the History of the American Engineering Profession, in THE
PROFESSIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 127, 128-29 (Nathan O. Hatch ed. 1988).
28 Id. at 128-30.
29 LAYTON, supra note 19, at 2.
30 Id.
25
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A. Early Years of Licensing
During the 17th and early 18th centuries, only physicians and lawyers had
to have a license to do their jobs.31 Restrictive licensing for medicine and law
began to disappear during the early 19th Century32. The waning of these
professions came at the hands of reformers, caught up in the zeal of the
Jacksonian era (from about 1820 to 1845) to equalize American society by
opening the professions to the masses.33 By 1850, licensing of physicians had
ended entirely.34 Practitioners of alternative medicine, especially homeopathy,35
increased in number and gained popularity, notably garnering the support of
well-to-do and politically powerful individuals.36 The homeopaths were able to
leverage this popularity into achieving repeal of licensing laws that restricted the
practice of medicine to “regulars,” or physicians of traditional remedies of
bleeding and mercury-based cathartics.37 Only vestiges of licenses for lawyers
remained at the middle of the 19th Century. In 1851, for example, Indiana’s new
constitution opened the practice of law to everyone by providing that “[e]very
person of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to
practice law in all courts of justice.”38 About the only governmental restraint on
the practice of law anywhere by 1850 was passage of an examination
administered by a court, usually the local trial court, and a number of states did
not require even that.39

31

Wallace, supra note 25, at 46.
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 4, at 18-19.
33 See Rebecca Roiphe, A History of Professionalism: Julius Henry Cohen and the Professions as a
Route to Citizenship, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 33, 40 (2012).
34 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 4, at 18.
35 “[H]omeopathy is premised on four cardinal principles: (1) most diseases are attributed to an
infectious disorder known as the psora (itch); (2) the body contains a spiritual force (vitalism)
which directs its own healing process; (3) remedies are discerned by giving healthy patients
repeated doses of many common remedies and recording the symptoms they produce (proving),
then applying those substances, in highly diluted doses, to conditions with those symptoms (Law of
Similars); and (4) remedies become more effective with greater dilution (Law of Infinitesimals) and
become more diluted when shaken or agitated (potentizing).” Patrick L. Sheldon, The Truth About
Homeopathy: A Discussion of the Practice and the Dangers that Inhere, 8 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH
L.J. 289, 290-91 (2005).
36 Homeopathic physicians gained popularity among “wealthy and cultured Americans who
objected to the ‘sledgehammer’ doses of medicines then in vogue.” JOHN S. HALLER, JR., A
PROFILE IN ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE: THE ECLECTIC MEDICAL COLLEGE OF CINCINNATI 19 (1999).
37 Robert L. Numbers, The Fall and Rise of the American Medical Profession, in THE PROFESSIONS
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 51, 54 (Nathan O. Hatch ed. 1988). See also HALLER, supra note 36, at 19.
38 Maxwell H. Bloomfield, Law: The Development of a Profession, in THE PROFESSIONS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 33, 35 (Nathan O. Hatch ed. 1988) (citation omitted).
39 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 4, at 19.
32
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Licensing’s virtual disappearance by the Civil War has been described as
a “remarkable reversal.”40 In addition to the Jacksonian reformers’ push for
opening the professions to everyone and the political power gained by
“outsiders,” the Council of State Governments has identified three other factors
that precipitated rejection of occupational licensing during this period. They
were: (1) governments’ adoption of a laissez-faire policy toward the growing
industrial sector; (2) a shortage of professionals to serve the nation’s exploding
population; and (3) a preference for decentralized government in the new,
unsettled areas, which typically resulted in loose regulatory standards for
business and occupations.41
During this time of laissez-faire, the number of engineers remained
small. Between 1816 and 1850, the number of engineers in the United States
grew from an estimated thirty to 2,000.42 Nearly all of their work involved canal
building and railroad construction, and such projects were where individuals
gained their skills and knowledge in the mechanic arts—through on-the-job
training.43 Sunny Auyang describes these early engineers as mostly uneducated
and from the lower classes of society.44 “Even among leading engineers . . .,”
Auyang says, “[t]he majority had been apprenticed to millwrights, barbers,
carpenters, stone masons, instrument makers. Because of their humble origins,
these pioneering engineers were often stereotyped as craftsmen incapable of
scientific reasoning.”45
As technology incorporated scientific principles, it gradually moved
beyond the capabilities of an artisan or businessman whose limited understanding
of science and physics could not keep pace. Institutions and specialty schools
began springing up around the country to fill the gap and to supplant on-the-job
training.46 The Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York, and the
Maryland Mechanics’ Institute, both established in 1824, were among the first to
offer programs intended to transform the old workforce into technicians through
night classes and magazines.47 These casual educational endeavors were
unsuccessful because lessons had to be taught on such a basic level that they had
little value for on-the-job application.48 What was needed was not knowledge of
science and physics as much as understanding of its methods.49 Engineering took

40 Id.
41 Id.
42 LAYTON,

supra note 19, at 3.
Id.
44 SUNNY Y. AUYANG, ENGINEERING—AN ENDLESS FRONTIER 115 (2004).
45 Id.
46 Sinclair, supra note 27, at 129.
47 Id. at 129-30.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 130.
43
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on an emphasis on application—on form and method.50 After a coalition of
scientists and industrialists gained control of the Franklin Institute in
Philadelphia, it initiated in 1836 a new curriculum to train engineers in these
methods, and it became one of the first successful programs.51 The institute’s
curriculum laid the foundation for development of formal, full-time, universitylevel engineering education and a decided shift away from apprenticeship
training.52 Molded by the collaborative work of scientists and industrialists,
engineering began to take definite shape. Bruce Sinclair has observed that
“scientists saw career opportunities in teaching, research, and publication, while
the entrepreneurs visualized greater profits from an applied-science-based
industry . . . .”53 At times, either the science side or the entrepreneur side of the
coalition dominated, setting off an incessant debate over whether engineering
should be more science or more art or application.54
Before the Civil War, other privately-funded institutions began to offer
programs similar to the Franklin Institute’s offering.55 In 1862, the Morrill Act
provided funding for public agricultural and mechanical colleges, and public
institutions began offering courses in civil, mechanical, mining, and chemical
engineering.56 By 1896, an engineering student could choose from 110 colleges
offering an engineering curriculum, and the number of students skyrocketed from
around 1,000 in 1890 to around 10,000 in 1900.57
As deaths resulting from failure of the industrial revolution’s machinery
mounted,58 the profession’s leaders resolved that the profession should police
itself through formation of engineering societies. Civil engineers organized
societies of local engineers in Boston (1848), New York (1852), St. Louis (1868),
and Chicago (1869).59 In 1869, the New York society morphed into the
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), which began pushing for attaining
recognition of engineering as a learned professional on par with medicine and

50

Id.
Id.
52 Id. at 132.
53 Id. at 132-33.
54 See LAYTON, supra note 19, at 26-27.
55 Sinclair, supra note 27, at 131.
56 Id.
57 LAYTON, supra note 19, at 4.
58 For example, boilers exploded routinely, reaching a rate of about 400 a year by 1900. AUYANG,
supra note 44, at 292. In 1865, about 1,700 passengers of the steamboat Sultana, mostly Union
soldiers returning home from Confederate prison camps, were killed when the vessel’s boiler
exploded on the Mississippi River. Miss. Historical Soc’y, Surviving the Worst: The Wreck of the
Sultana at the End of the American Civil War, http://mshistorynow.mdah.state.ms.us/articles/319/
surviving-the-worst-the-wreck-of-the-sultana (visited Jan. 11, 2015).
59 LAYTON, supra note 19, at 29. Although the New York society called itself the American
Society of Civil Engineers, it functioned as an organization for New York engineers. Id.
51
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law.60 At about the same time, mining engineers organized the American
Institute of Mining Engineers (AIME), which functioned principally as an arm of
the mining and metals industries.61 Engineers continued to organize regional
societies, but ASCE’s and AIME’s formation and function as national societies
began to overshadow the regional organizations.62
ASCE began setting the pace for moving engineering into profession
status. Its membership requirements were higher than other societies: members
had to have practiced engineering for five years and “be in charge of engineering
work.”63 Those requirements were upped in 1891 to having ten years of practice,
being in charge of engineering for at least five years, and being able to do design
work.64 These high standards, however, became a stumbling block to ASCE’s
supplanting regional societies and specialty groups. Unable to meet ASCE’s
requirements, engineers either broke off into splinter groups or worked
exclusively with local societies.65
Engineers working in industry, however, provoked the most difficult
internal problems for ASCE.
These individuals dubbed themselves as
mechanical engineers, but often they were only glorified plant managers or
superintendents with little or no formal engineering training.66 ASCE leadership
began to loath the close affiliation such engineers had with industry and initiated
toward the end of the 19th Century a fight for engineering’s independence from
industry’s control.67 It understood, however, that outside influence exerted by the
likes of railroads and other major industrial firms had to be appeased, which
frequently led to compromises concerning ASCE policies.68 Concerning the
ASCE’s attempts to attain profession status for engineering at the time, Edwin
Layton observed:
By the end of the nineteenth century, leaders of the ASCE
viewed the progress of their society with a satisfaction bordering on
complacency. The success of the ASCE rested on its very high
professional standards of membership and the diversity of occupational
roles open to civil engineers. Corporation employees were not in
ascendency; nor was any single industry dominant. Presidents of the
ASCE took a high degree of professional autonomy for granted. They
depreciated the disagreements between civil engineers serving as expert

60

See id. at 29-30.
Id. at 29.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 29-30.
64 Id. at 30.
65 Id. at 31.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 32.
68 Id.
61
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witnesses before the courts and suggested, instead, that the professional
engineer ought to serve the courts themselves rather than the litigants.
Such a role implied that engineers should be independent of specific
commercial interests.69

The nemesis of the ASCE’s attempts to move engineering into profession
status was the AIME. The institute’s obvious purpose was to serve the mining
industry’s interests, and it showed no interest at all in developing engineering
into a profession.70 Virtually anyone could obtain full membership.71
As industrialization resulted in rapid change of American society,
engineering benefitted greatly. Industrialization created a bounty of engineering
jobs, and engineers suddenly grew in numbers, wealth, and influence. Between
1850 and 1880, the number of engineers in the United States jumped from about
2,000 to about 7,000.72 By 1920, that number had multiplied to about 136,000.73
But the more engineers grew in numbers, the less engineering moved
toward profession status. In the closing decades of the 19th Century, engineering
was badly splintered, and engineers debated vigorously whether their best
interests lay in independence from business or in casting their lots with it.
Generally, engineers opted for the middle road. They rejected AIME’s extreme
business leanings, but they spurned ASCE’s push for independence as being
unable to serve the needs of engineering specialists emerging in industry.74
Engineers favoring the middle road position organized the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) in 1880.75 A coalition of engineers,
inventors, and others established the American Institute of Electrical Engineers
(AIEE).76 More than previous societies, these new organizations better reflected
the general attitude of the growing number of engineers working in industry.
Neither organization saw a need for the independence from business advocated
by ASCE or for maintaining a close union between engineering and business as
practiced by AIME.77
Nearly all of ASME’s leaders were owners of industrial firms, which
blunted any discussion of independence.78 ASME restricted membership to
individuals who were in “responsible charge” of engineering projects, but it was
sufficiently loose in enforcing the requirement that more than half of its members

69

Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 3.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 35.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Sinclair, supra note 27, at 135.
70

648

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:3

were managers or owners of industrial firms.79 An early ASME president
described society members as “good mechanics by instinct, good men by original
construction, good fellows by nature and habit and training.”80 Nonetheless, at
least until the 20th Century, professional engineers rather than business interests
remarkably controlled ASME’s affairs and policies.81
The coalition of engineers, inventors and industrialists established the
AIEE so the United States would have a representative organization at
Philadelphia’s International Electrical Exposition in 1884.82 AIEE was the
American counterpart to the British Institute of Electrical Engineers, and its first
president, Norvin Green, president of Western Union Telegraph Company and a
physician and politician, was not an engineer.83 Notwithstanding Green’s
leadership and the large number of non-engineer participants, AIEE remained
committed to professional engineering ideals. This commitment resulted
primarily from the institute’s focus on electrical engineering. Unlike the other
engineering specialties, electrical engineering did not evolve from an old artisan
craft but was involved with application of science and physics.84 To belong to
AIEE, engineers had to have been involved in some capacity with engineering
for five years, have been in responsible charge of engineering projects for two
years, and been able to design engineering systems.85 At first, business interests
were denied full membership, and this did not create any strife until after the turn
of the century.86
Known as the “founder societies,” ASCE, AIME, ASME, and AIEE
endeavored to operate as federations of all engineering specialties at the end of
the 19th Century,87 but this was not successful. Although specialty groups
enjoyed much self-governance within these societies, they still broke away to
form their own specialized society groups. The Naval Society of Architects and
Marine Engineers began in 1893, followed by the American Society of Heating
and Ventilating Engineers in 1894, the American Railway Engineering
Association in 1899, the American Electrochemical Society in 1902, the Society
of Automotive Engineers in 1904, the Illuminating Engineering Society in 1906,
the American Institute of Chemical Engineers in 1908, and the Institute of Radio
Engineers in 1912.88 These groups broke off from the founder societies in
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supra note 19, at 36-37.
Sinclair, supra note 27, at 137 (citation omitted).
81 LAYTON, supra note 19, at 37.
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84 Id. at 38-39.
85 Id. at 39.
86 Id. at 39-40.
87 Id. at 40.
88 Id. at 41.
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disagreement over the proper balance between business and professional
interests. These new groups sought a closer alliance with business.89
B. Vying for Professionalism at the Beginning of the 20th Century
Rapid industrialization after the Civil War quickly transformed American
society from agrarian to urban. Industrialization resulted in domination of
society by manufacturing firms and corporations.90 Advances in science and
technology gave rise to many new occupations such as plumbers and electricians,
and individuals working in these new positions began organizing societies to
promote their mutual interests.91 Several of these societies began pushing for
occupational licenses in hope that restrictive licenses would create monopolies of
jobs that would reap economic benefits.92
Significant changes in society brought on by the nation’s rapid
industrialization also increased pressure on governments to begin licensing and
regulating occupations. Urbanization changed the way consumers interacted
with providers of goods and services. Unlike inhabitants of rural areas, city
dwellers often did not know the persons from whom they bought their goods or
on whom they depended for important services.93 Not only were these providers
of goods and services strangers to their customers and clients, but they suddenly
began using mysterious, newly-invented instruments, such as the
ophthalmoscope,94 resulting from scientific breakthroughs. Such instruments
allowed physicians and scientists to pierce into a realm previously not knowable
by unaided human senses—or at least make the claim that they could.
Consumers did not have the understanding, experience, or education to verify
these claims.95 They had no way of testing their suspicions of being cheated.
Helpless, they supported regulatory laws proposed by progressive reformers for
imposing bureaucratic regulation, including licensing, for protecting the public
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92 Id. at 20-21.
93 Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of Professionals and the
Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 723, 729-31 (2005).
94 Id. German ophthalmologist Hermann von Helmholtz is credited with developing an instrument
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from incompetent and cheating providers.96 Joining beleaguered consumers in
seeking the government’s intervention were honest providers who believed that
licensing was an effective way of purging “bad apples” from their ranks and
avoid their spoiling everyone’s reputation.97
Legislators responded to these calls by enacting legislation requiring
competency examinations as a requisite to obtaining a license to practice any
number of professions and occupations. At the close of the 19th Century and in
the early years of the 20th Century, the states quickly began enacting “[l]aws to
license doctors, plumbers, barbers, [beauticians,] funeral directors, nurses,
electricians, horseshoers, dentists, and the practitioners of many other
occupations. . . .”98 States adopted most of these licensing laws between 1900
and 1920, a time when progressivism was at its peak of influence. Marc Law and
Sukkoo Kim note a jump in medical malpractice lawsuits during this era and
concluded that it may have resulted from plaintiffs’ using licensing laws, which
favored the regulars, to establish a standard of acceptable medical practice.99
Before licensing laws, plaintiffs had difficulty establishing that the practices of
“quacks” were contrary to acceptable standards.
During this period, however, consumers did not show signs of being
concerned by the practices of engineers, probably because they rarely
encountered engineers—certainly not as routinely as they did doctors,
veterinarians, barbers, hairdressers, electricians, plumbers, and lawyers.
Consumers rarely had cause for consulting an engineer, and engineers then, as
now, had little cause for interacting with the public; they did their work for the
most part as employees of industrial and manufacturing firms. So long as the
business firms took responsibility for their engineering employees’ work, no one
expressed concern. Engineering leaders deemed industrial managers to be far
better judges of their engineering employees’ competence than the public or
government.

96 Page Smith describes the progressive movement at the beginning of the 20th Century as the
outgrowth of “the Protestant Passion, the desire to redeem the world, . . .which brought on, in large
part, the American Revolution itself. Prior to the Civil War it manifested itself most strikingly in
the antislavery movement, but it had a dozen familiar forms: temperance, the women’s rights
movement, the peace movement, the reform of prisons and mental institutions, justice for the
Indians, reform of clothes and diet, and dozens of others . . . . [P]rogressivism was the brief
crystallization of accumulations of reform sentiment, a nationwide political revival meeting of a
kind not uncommon in our history when rational men and women pledged ‘their lives, their
fortunes and their sacred honor’ to make the world new once more[,] . . . and it was in a sometimes
uneasy alliance with the new scholarship, with science, and the handmaid of science, research.”
PAGE SMITH, 7 AMERICA ENTERS THE WORLD: A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND
WORLD WAR I 345-46 (1985).
97 Id. at 347-48.
98 Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910: A Legal
and Social Study, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 489 (1965).
99 Law & Kim, supra note 93, at 750-53.
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Engineers themselves were, for the most part, dismissive of calls for
licensing by the Progressives. A few favored licensing, but most agreed with the
laissez-faire and anti-licensing positions of their industrial allies. One aspect of
progressive reforms, however, did significantly affect development of
engineering. Progressives were successful in fighting corruption in city
governments, and much of the corruption involved civil engineering projects,
such as sewers, streetcar systems, and streetlights.100 As graft involving such
projects ended, civil engineers were able to attain a new level of
professionalism.101
With a flood of new, young graduates of recently formed engineering
schools joining engineering ranks, the profession made a radical change at the
beginning of the 20th Century. For the most part, these new engineers went to
work for industrial firms, which were riding the crest of industrialization and
booming. Bruce Sinclair describes the transformation:
Partnerships and owner-manager firms in the mechanical industries, the
kind of enterprises that had set the style of professionalism, were
increasingly being replaced by corporate structures. Instead of a
manager engineer intimately familiar with the shop floor, these new
corporations featured engineering departments separated not only from
the shop floor but from the firm’s financial administration, too. And in
those larger organizations the drive for system and order . . . tended
increasingly to make engineers, especially junior ones, identical units in
the corporate machine.102

In the estimation of Ralph Nader, the multitude of junior engineers
taking jobs at business firms were assuming positions of “minion to corporate
management.”103 Indeed, industry managers continued to assert control of even
the engineering societies to which the engineers belonged. For example, in 1909,
Morris L. Cooke, a notable mechanical engineer and Philadelphia’s city engineer,
sought to convene a session at ASME’s annual meeting on the increasing
problem of urban air pollution.104 Anticipating that his proposal would draw
opposition, he supported it with a petition signed by many prominent ASME
members, but, after managers at New York Edison and New York Central
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Railroad voiced strong opposition to the program, the planning committee turned
down Cooke’s proposal without explanation.105
Not only were 20th Century engineers still controlled in many ways by
outside industrial interests, they were badly splintered into quarreling factions,
typically at odds over how close engineering should be allied with business. The
young societies that broke away from the founder societies at the turn of the
century did so to forge bonds with business that were so tight the societies often
functioned more as trade associations than as engineering societies.106 For
example, the Society of Automotive Engineer deemed one of its missions to be
helping small, fledgling automotive companies compete with the automotive
giants by working for adoption of technical standards.107
Notwithstanding engineering’s close ties with business, engineers
working in industry maintained strong interest in professionalism. Engineering
leaders were confident that engineering had a sound claim for asserting that
engineering was a bona fide profession. Their claim rested on three themes.
They saw engineers as the agents of technological change and, therefore, the vital
force behind human progress.108 They perceived that, because engineers were
objective thinkers and problem-solvers, they were best suited for leading societal
reforms, and the leaders believed that engineers had a duty to make certain that
technological change was beneficial to society.109 In other words, they
considered engineering’s relation to science to be a sufficient basis for
engineering’s claiming profession status. They asserted that engineering’s close
tie to business should be ignored because corporations merely were the machines
or vehicles by which engineers plied their professional skills.110
Hence, voices of reform, such as that of Morris Cooke, calling for an end
of engineering’s alliance with business went unheeded. Engineers at the
beginning of the 20th Century tenaciously clung to the notion that had defined
engineering from its earliest days: its interests were identical to those of the
firms where engineers worked.111 Only a handful of engineers, virtually all civil
engineers, saw any merit to joining in the licensing movement that was occurring
among the other professions.
Instead of supporting outside regulation such as government licensing
boards, engineers conceived professionalism to be tied to self-regulation. ASCE
preferred self-regulation to government licensing on the rationale that only
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engineers should pass judgment on the work of engineers.112 ASCE’s
publication, Engineering News, for example, editorialized in 1908 that regulation
focused on the engineer as an individual rather than on what truly mattered, the
engineer’s work.113 The public would be better protected by focusing on the
latter.114
Although engineers generally failed to appreciate the benefits to be
reaped from licensing, the point was not missed by small pockets of engineers
organizing themselves around local societies. One of the most profound
demonstrations of those benefits came at the hands of physicians who were
practicing traditional medicine—the regulars. They showed that licensing could
be an effective means of not only of attaining profession status, but also of
reengineering a profession to exclude “detractors.”
C. Medical Profession Shows How to Use Licensing to Reengineer a
Profession
The transformation that licensing laws caused in the medical profession
is a graphic illustration of how licensing laws can be used to elevate an
occupation group into profession status. The battle in medicine between the
regulars and practitioners of alternative medicine115 came to a head in West
Virginia in 1881 when the state’s legislature passed a law restricting lawful
medical practice to traditional medicine.116 The “regulars” pushed through the
legislation that effectively shutout practitioners of alternative medicine and
secured professional standing for the regulars, allowing them to reengineer and
control medicine as a profession.117
The West Virginia story culminated in the landmark Supreme Court
decision in Dent v. West Virginia.118 Although the decision has all but been
forgotten in administrative law texts,119 it was monumental in establishing a
state’s broad power to define and regulate a profession in contravention of the
sacrosanct freedom of contract.120
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The dispute in Dent arose when, in 1882, West Virginia authorities
indicted 27-year-old Frank Dent on misdemeanor charges of practicing medicine
without a license in Newburg, West Virginia.121 The indictment came just
months after West Virginia became the first state to pass a licensing law that
restricted the practice of medicine to a defined class.122 Dent was a fourthgeneration physician and had apprenticed for five years under his father, who
was a degreed graduate of “a well-recognized Regular school.”123 All four
generations of Dents had practiced traditional medicine in Newburg, and Frank
Dent had practiced for seven years as a partner with his father and on his own.124
West Virginia’s new law provided that Dent could obtain a license and
continue practicing medicine by establishing that he satisfied one of three
requirements: (1) that he had a diploma issued by “a reputable medical college”;
(2) that he had practiced medicine for ten years before 1881; or (3) that he passed
a two-part written and oral examination administered by the new West Virginia
Board of Health.125 After learning that the board would not give him credit for
his five years’ apprenticeship under his father, thus depriving him of a claim of
ten years of practice before 1881, Dent relocated his practice to Topeka, Kansas,
where a license was not required.126 He quickly returned home to Newburg,
however, after deciding that Kansas’ climate did not suit him or his lung ailment
(likely tuberculosis).127 On his return to Newburg, he stopped in Cincinnati long
enough to complete a couple of “short courses” at the American Medical Eclectic
College where, after passing final examinations, he received a medical doctor
degree.128 Having obtained a diploma, he resumed his medical practice in
Newburg until a rival physician informed authorities of his unlicensed practice.129
When board members investigated, Dent presented his recently-issued
diploma.130 The board rejected the diploma as not having been issued by a
reputable medical college.131 Deciding the new licensing law deprived him of a
basic freedom to practice medicine as he saw fit, Dent declined the board’s
invitation to sit for an examination.132 He opted instead to challenge the law’s
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constitutionality on the ground that it deprived him of his “vested right” to
practice medicine.133 In a perfunctory trial presented on stipulated facts, a jury
returned a guilty verdict after deliberating briefly.134 The court fined Dent $50,
the minimum allowed.135
When Dent’s appeals reached the United States Supreme Court in 1889,
Justice Stephen Field declared for a unanimous court that West Virginia did not
unduly interfere with Dent’s freedom to choose his occupation or profession.136
The court acknowledged that choosing an occupation is “a distinguishing feature
of our republican institutions,”137 but offsetting this right was West Virginia’s
right to restrict the practice of medicine to individuals whom legislators believed
had the appropriate education and experience.138 This, the court explained, was
because the practice of medicine is not just an ordinary occupation, but is one
that requires “careful preparation,” including mastery of “all those subtle and
mysterious influences upon which health and life depend . . . .”139 With that
description, Justice Field secured medicine’s standing as a profession, which,
unlike ordinary occupations, required the state’s close scrutiny and regulation.
Nonetheless, Justice Field explained, West Virginia’s exercise of police
power had to be reasonable to comply with due process.140 West Virginia’s law
satisfied this requirement if its demands and constraints were not arbitrary or
capricious, a very low standard. To satisfy the standard, the law merely had to
treat every physician alike, and the West Virginia statute did:
It applies to all physicians . . . . It imposes no conditions which cannot
be readily met; and it is made enforceable . . . by regular proceedings
adapted to the case. It authorizes an examination of the applicant by
the board of health as to his qualifications when he has no evidence of
them in the diploma of a reputable medical college in the school of
medicine to which he belongs, or has not practiced in the state a
designated period . . . . If, in the proceedings under the statute, there
should be any unfair or unjust action on the part of the board in
refusing him a certificate, we doubt not that a remedy would be found
in the courts of the state. But no such imputation can be made, for the
plaintiff in error did not submit himself to the examination of the board
after it had decided that the diploma he presented was insufficient.141
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Dent all but ended the hope of practitioners of alternative medicine for
recognition. Not only did it affirm a state’s power to choose among factions in a
profession, but it also demonstrated that, of all the factors that can transform an
occupation into a recognized profession, none is more powerful than
governmental licensing.
Dent demonstrated that politics is as important a factor as merit in
achieving passage of licensing legislation. Although the regulars’ victory in
West Virginia coincided with notable scientific breakthroughs, politics, rather
than scientific merit, seems to have been the greater driving force in West
Virginia’s decision. The record is void of any time when legislators considered
the merit of preferring traditional medicine over homeopathy and eclectic
treatment.142 As James Mohr notes, the regulars “never cited a single scientific
advance to illustrate why doctors suddenly needed to understand the research
sciences. In their defense of scientific education, they never once explained why
a laboratory knowledge of chemistry would be necessary to administer future
therapies that might emerge from chemical laboratories.”143 That a maturing
medical profession in the latter half of the 20th Century would seem to acquit the
West Virginia legislators’ choice does not make the original decision any less
politically motivated.
After Dent, the Supreme Court confirmed in later cases involving
physician licensing that a state has virtually unfettered policymaking power in
regulating a profession. Four years after Dent, Justice David Brewer declared for
a unanimous Supreme Court, “The power of a state to make reasonable
provisions for determining the qualifications of those engaging in the practice of
medicine, and punishing those who attempt to engage therein in defiance of such
statutory provisions, is not open to question.”144
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D. Push for Engineering Licensure
The clear message of the courts’ decisions was that licensing laws were
an effective means for securing and shaping a profession, and, caught up in the
Progressives’ push for regulation,145 state legislatures rapidly passed laws
requiring licenses to practice a number of occupations: plumbing, barbering, hair
dressing, funeral directing, electrical work, fitting horses with shoes, and
eventually flower arranging in Louisiana.146 The overall attitude of engineers,
however, was opposition to licensure. They preferred to continue policing
themselves.
But other regional organizations of engineers saw the opportunity
presented by licensure. One of the first such groups to act was a small group of
civil engineers in Louisiana, which began lobbying in about 1898 for laws to
restrict the practice of civil engineering to license holders.147 Initially, the
legislature rebuffed their proposals when other civil engineers opposed them.148
The proponents of licensing eventually succeeded in 1908,149 but, before they did,
a notable civil engineer and Wyoming’s state engineer, Clarence Johnston,
lobbied for150 and obtained in Wyoming in 1907 what has come to be recognized
as the first engineering licensing law in the United States, although the law was
very limited in its scope.151
In his January 1904 report to the Governor, Johnston, a graduate of the
University of Michigan’s civil engineering program,152 lamented that most
anyone—even lawyers—could prepare the survey maps that had to be attached to
applications for state irrigation permits.153 The result, Johnston said, was that the
maps were of no use to his office or Wyoming landowners.154 This initiated a
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push for legislation that restricted preparation of survey maps to engineers and
land surveyors holding a license. In defending his proposal, Johnston described
preparation of the survey maps as “one of the most important duties of the
engineer in Wyoming” because of its effect on the public.155 He further argued
that federal authorities required mining surveyors to submit to an examination
and mining surveys are “no more important than the surveys which should be
made prior to the preparation of maps and applications, for permit to use the
water of the public.”156
Wyoming’s legislature responded by enacting in 1907 the nation’s first
licensing law of any kind pertaining to engineering.157 It said:
All engineers and surveyors who shall hereafter perform any
field work preliminary to the preparation of an application for permit to
use the water of the State or who shall make surveys or do engineering
work relative to the utilization or use of water, shall satisfy a board to
be known as the Board of Examining Engineers . . . that they belong to
one or more of [five] classes [of land surveyor (Class One),
topographic engineer, (Class Two), hydraulic and hydrographic
engineer (Class Three), construction and designing engineer (Class
Four), and administrative irrigation engineer (Class Five)].158

The law did not otherwise restrict the practice of engineering in Wyoming.
Anyone could engage lawfully in any other form of engineering in the state.
In the meantime, as the Louisiana civil engineers pushed for what would
truly be the first engineering licensing law, Johnston joined fellow civil
engineers, members of the American Society of Civil Engineers, in opposing
them.159 ASCE was strongly committed to self-regulation, and the civil engineers
opposing the licensing proposal believed the Louisiana law was much too
broad.160 It sought not only to regulate engineers and engineering through the
power of the state, but to regulate all civil engineers, even those who did not
reside in Louisiana.161 Johnston noted that the legislation he had endorsed
addressed a specific problem created by a particular group, whereas the
Louisiana engineers sought to regulate engineering without being able to
articulate any existing problems.162
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The opponents’ views prevailed for a few years but failed in the end.
After repeated rebuffs, the Louisiana legislature passed in 1908 the first law in
the United States that restricted the practice of civil engineering to licensed
individuals.163 In addition to requiring licensure, Louisiana’s law established a
state agency and granted it power to set standards for the practice of civil
engineering in Louisiana.164
ASCE was more successful in defeating licensing efforts in other states.
Licensing legislation was proposed in Idaho in 1909, and the next year bills were
considered in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York.165 In 1911, the Alabama
legislature considered a proposed engineering licensing law.166 In each state, civil
engineers, primarily members of ASCE, were able to defeat the measures by
arguing that only engineers, not the state, should regulate the practice of
engineering.167
In 1915, Illinois became the third state to enact an engineering licensing
law, but the law applied only to persons engaged in structural engineering.168
Illinois would wait until 1945 to enact an all-encompassing engineering licensing
law.169
In 1917, Florida became the first state to enact an engineering licensing
law that encompassed all engineering specialties.170 The legislation came about
because of the lobbying efforts of Florida engineers who had organized the
Florida Engineering Society just the previous year.171 As their first order of
business, society members began lobbying for a licensing law172 and quickly
persuaded state legislators that restricting the practice of engineering to licensed
individuals was the best way to ensure that Florida built a long-lasting
infrastructure, which was then much in its infancy.173
Although ASCE leaders were fully committed to professionalism, they
perceived engineers, not government bureaucrats, best understood what
constituted good engineering practices. Proponents of licensing believed that
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placing engineers on governing boards and putting practicing engineers in charge
of formulating regulation should allay these concerns. The boom years before
the Great Depression helped squelch interest in licensing. It was never
completely forgotten, but with so many engineers prospering along with a
flourishing industry, licensing gained little traction among engineers.174
Opposition to licensing waned with an end of the good times.
Challenges to the ideas of the “old guard” by the numerous young engineers
entering the profession had already chipped away some opposition to licensure,175
but economic bad times was quite effective in quieting opposition. With many
engineers out of work during the Great Depression of the 1930s, licensing
became appealing, especially to the young engineers. It had the potential of
limiting the supply of engineers and protecting jobs and salaries.176 Edwin
Layton describes the situation:
In the period between 1929 and 1933, the income of engineers declined
almost twice as much as the average of all salaries. It was the younger
men who were hardest hit by unemployment and low salaries. The
consultants in civil engineering felt especially threatened in the 1930s,
because so much of the remaining work in their field was undertaken
by the federal government. The private consultant appeared to be
facing extinction.177

Hence, ASCE’s opposition waned, and support for licensure picked up
momentum—at least momentarily. By 1933, legislatures in twenty-seven of the
then forty-eight states had enacted laws requiring a license to practice at least
some aspect of engineering working.178 Hawaii, as a territory, enacted a licensing
law in 1923.179

174 See LAYTON,

supra note 19, at 237-38.
Id. at 111. In 1909, a group of young engineers organized a “rump group,” known as the
Technical League, for the purpose of challenging the conservative ideas, including opposition to
licensure, holding sway among ASCE leaders. Id. at 111. The league was able to cause
introduction of a bill in the New York legislature in 1910 that would restrict the practice of all
engineering to graduates of a four-year engineering school. Id. at 112. The bill was killed only
after much effort exerted by ASCE’s leadership and a compromise in which ASCE leaders agreed
to formulate a long-forestalled code of ethics. Id.
176 Id. at 237.
177 Id.
178 PAUL H. ROBBINS, BUILDING FOR PROFESSIONAL GROWTH: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS 1934-1984, at 299 (1984). States joining the first four in
passing licensing laws were Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, and Oregon in 1919; New
York and Virginia in 1920; Arizona, Indiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and West Virginia in 1921; South Carolina in 1922; Arkansas and South
Dakota in 1925; Mississippi in 1928; California in 1929; Wisconsin in 1931; and Ohio in 1933. Id.
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But opposition never went away. Much of it emanated from a realization
of leaders of the engineering societies that they would not be able to qualify for
licensure. Most of the leaders were executives or managers of industrial firms.
Because they had not practiced engineering for some time, they feared that they
would be unable to pass a licensing examination.180 Moreover, many considered
the “closed profession” associated with licensure to be tantamount to collectivism
or unionization, and the opposition to both was very strong among engineers.181
Furthermore, many engineering leaders remained quite committed to industry,
and industrial leaders mounted much opposition to licensing. They argued that
licensing laws would expose their firms to undue governmental intrusion into
their internal employee affairs.182
A few engineering leaders, however, understood the importance of
licensing to engineering’s achieving full profession status. They recognized that
achieving profession status was unlikely until every state restricted the practice
of engineering to individuals meeting minimum standards of knowledge,
education, and experience. One of the more notable advocates for licensing was
David Steinman, a renowned civil engineer and bridge builder.183 In 1934, after
failing to garner support for his ideas among other engineering leaders, he led in
establishment of the National Society of Professional Engineers for the purpose
of uniting the profession in gaining the elusive profession status.184 “Engineers
are pioneers, pathfinders, trailblazers in almost everything they do—with one
exception,” he lamented in a 1932 speech.185 “They have left it to the other
professions to be the pioneers and trailblazers in securing professional
recognition in the field of organizational and legislative activities for the
advancement of the status of the profession.”186 Steinman acknowledged that
engineering licensing laws were “necessary for the safety of the public,” but he
understood, too, that they were “also necessary for the protection of the good
name of the profession.”187
With twenty-two states yet to enact a licensing law and with industry’s
opposition growing stronger, Steinman persuaded NSPE members to embark on
an all-out campaign to achieve licensing in the remaining states. He also wanted
to seek amendment of narrowly-scoped laws that applied to only one specialty,188
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235.
181

662

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:3

and he led NSPE in beginning to push in 1934 for uniform licensing laws among
the states.189
Steinman and those joining with him traveled to state capitols to lobby
legislators. They gave speeches, wrote letters, published numerous editorials,
and helped draft legislation.190 Their campaign was successful. In the
campaign’s first year alone—in 1935—seven states adopted licensing laws.191 By
1940, only five states did not have engineering licensing laws,192 and by 1947 all
forty-eight states had enacted some form of engineering licensing law.193 The
territory of Alaska enacted a licensing law in 1939, and the United States
Congress made engineering licensing universal by enacting a law in 1950 that
applied to the District of Columbia.194
Tragedy often is an effective catalyst for remedial legislation and can go
a long way in disarming opposition. Indeed, in addition to NSPE’s campaign,
engineering failures played a significant role in motivating legislators to pass
engineering licensing laws. Two disastrous events were particularly significant
in the states’ enactment of licensing laws.195
One of the disasters was the collapse of the poorly-designed St. Francis
Dam on the Santa Clara River near Los Angeles in 1928 in which 400 to 600
persons perished.196 Overseeing every detail of the dam’s construction was
William Mulholland, Los Angeles’ chief engineer who was self-educated and
had begun as a ditch digger.197 Mulholland overlooked obvious indications that
he was placing the dam on an unstable fault line.198 A year later, California
legislators enacted laws requiring civil engineers to be licensed.199
The other disaster was a natural gas explosion resulting from a poorlydesigned gas distribution system at a school in New London, Texas, in 1937.200

189 Id.

at 237; McGuirt, supra note 16, at 27.
ROBBINS, supra note 178, at 235.
191 Id. at 299. These states were Alabama, Connecticut, Maine, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and
Washington. Id.
192 Id. States enacting laws after 1935 were Georgia, Nebraska, and Texas in 1937; Kentucky and
Rhode Island in 1938; and Maryland and Vermont in 1939. Id.
193 Id. There last states to act were Delaware, Massachusetts, and Missouri in 1941, and North
Dakota in 1943. Id.
194 Id.
195 McGuirt, supra note 16, at 27-28.
196 Scott Harrison, St. Francis Dam Collapse, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2013), http://framework.latimes
.com/2013/03/12/st-francis-dam-collapse/#/0.
197 Thomas M. McMullen, The St. Francis Dam Collapse and Its Impact on the Construction of the
Hoover Dam at 2 (2004) (M.S. thesis, Univ. of Md.) (on file with Digital Repository at the Univ. of
Md.).
198 Id. at 3.
199 ROBBINS, supra note 178, at 299.
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http://www.tshaonline.org/day-by-day/30586 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
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Nearly 300 children and teachers died in the explosion when a spark from a
power tool in the school’s industrial arts room ignited a pool of natural gas that
had collected in the school’s crawl space.201 The gas leak occurred after school
maintenance workers improperly rigged connections of the school’s heating
system to a nearby oil field natural gas line.202 In response to the public’s
demand for remedial legislation, Texas legislators enacted an engineering
licensing law only months after the explosion.203
Although every jurisdiction had enacted engineering licensing laws by
1950, the laws did not close the profession as licensing proponents had expected.
The laws typically applied only to engineers in “responsible charge” of
engineering, leaving open engineering done under the supervision of an engineer
in responsible charge. Thus, the laws were generally irrelevant to the work of the
overwhelming mass of engineers who worked in industry and were not in
responsible charge of engineering projects. Nevertheless, to make certain that
the engineering being done within the confines of industry did not implicate
licensing laws, industry mounted its own counter-campaign to gain legislation
exempting from licensure engineering done by an employee of a manufacturer or
industrial firm.
III. INDUSTRIAL EXEMPTION: INDUSTRY’S COUNTERMAND OF
ENGINEERING LICENSURE
Beginning in about 1940, leaders of industrial firms and public utilities
mounted a counterattack against the licensing laws that endured for about twenty
years.204 Instead of seeking repeal of the licensing legislation, industry sought
exemption of their employees from licensing requirements. Industry asserted
that, so long as it was willing to take responsibility for its engineers’ work and
was liable for their negligence, licensing was unnecessary for protection of the
public’s interests. Moreover, industry lobbyists asked: who was a better judge
of an engineer’s competence than the entity that was taking legal responsibility
for his or her work?
Industry’s campaign for an industrial exemption was successful for the
most part. It attained industrial exemptions in three-fourths of the states—in all
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but twelve and the District of Columbia.205 Morton Fine, former executive
director of the National Council of Engineering Examiners, suggested that the
campaign’s success had less to do with the merits of industry’s arguments than
with industry’s overwhelming political influence.206 The lesson of Frank Dent’s
case in West Virginia would lend credence to this notion.207
A. The Nature of the Industrial Exemption
M. J. Kolhoff was an engineer working in industry who has endeavored
to articulate a defense of the industrial exemption as necessary for setting the
jurisdictional scope of licensing laws.208 Such “a delimiter,” as he called it, was
required by the “all-encompassing” manner in which most states defined
engineering.209 He saw the industrial exemption as a way of paring back broadlyworded licensing statutes to avoid including persons and activities that legislators
did not intend to include. He argued that the industrial exemption’s jurisdictional
function is important for protecting engineers from an overreaching government.
This protection is necessary, he asserted, because of the basic freedoms that are
at stake: engineers’ right to choose where and for whom to employ their skills.
As confirmed by the Supreme Court in Dent,210 this freedom is fundamental. A
state should be able to override this freedom only when necessary “to protect
citizens from possible fraud and other forms of economic or physical harm that
might stem from services by unscrupulous or unqualified practitioners. In

205 See Arthur Schwartz, Engineering Licensure Law Industrial/Manufacturing Exemptions Stateby-State,
Nat’l
Soc’y
of
Prof’l
Eng’rs
(June
2011),
http://www.nspe.org/sites/default/files/resources/pdfs/blog/Industrial-Exemption-Table.pdf. States
not having an industrial exemption include Alabama, Arkansas, Hawaii, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Id.
California adopted an industrial exemption, but it applies only to employees of the communication
industry. Id. Montana enacted an industrial exemption but repealed it. Id.
206 Morton Fine, Registration Viewed as Bond to Practice of Learned Profession, in ENGINEERING
PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICS 511, 511 (James A. Schaub et al., eds., 1983).
207 See supra notes 114-140 and accompanying text.
208 Kolhoff’s defense has been published as a section in ENGINEERING PROFESSIONALISM AND
ETHICS, supra note 10, at 526-30. This work originally appeared in PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER
(March 1976), at 34, and identified Kolhoff as staff associate for technical resources at General
Electric.
209 Kolhoff, supra note 10, at 527. An example of a broadly worded licensing statute is CA. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 6701. This statute defines a “professional engineer” as “a person engaged in the
professional practice of rendering service or creative work requiring education, training and
experience in engineering sciences and the application of special knowledge of the mathematical,
physical and engineering sciences in such professional or creative work as consultation,
investigation, evaluation, planning or design of public or private utilities, structures, machines,
processes, circuits, buildings, equipment or projects, and supervision of construction for the
purpose of securing compliance with specifications and design for any such work.” Id.
210 See supra notes 136-141 and accompanying text.
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particular, this protection has been applied where the public is unable to
adequately evaluate the qualifications of the practitioners that they may
employ.”211
Hence, Kolhoff argued, the industrial exemption has a “specific target”
to exempt “the internal engineering that is ancillary to the design, manufacture,
sale, service, and repair of products of [a] state’s industries.”212 A policy of
exempting ancillary engineering is sound, he asserted, because it does not
threaten the public’s safety and welfare. The only party affected is the one who
employs the engineer; hence, licensing applicable to ancillary engineering is
unnecessary and overreaching. Elimination of the exemption would expose
engineers in industry to unwarranted licensing; thus, unduly impinging on the
fundamental freedom of engineers working in industry.
In an attempt to establish that the engineering covered by the exemption
does not threaten the public, Kolhoff asked two pointed questions. First, “[a]re
. . . engineers in industry . . . posing a serious threat of injury to life, health, and
property of the state’s citizens—a threat for which there is inadequate legal
protection?”213 Second, “[w]ould [elimination of the industrial exemption]
appreciably reduce any residual product-related threat to life, health, or property
of the citizens of the state wherein the engineering is regulated?”214 His answer
to both was that he did not find “convincing evidence” of either proposition.215
Consistent with Kolhoff’s point, some state licensing laws do phrase the
exemption in terms suggesting that its target is internal ancillary engineering that
any industrial firm must do to get a product to market. Connecticut’s statute, for
example, exempts an employee of a “manufacturing or scientific research and
development corporation . . . provided the engineering work performed by such
. . . employees shall be incidental to the research and development or
manufacturing activities of such corporation . . . .”216 Missouri’s statute exempts
“[a]ny person engaged in engineering who is a full-time, regular employee of a
person engaged in manufacturing operations and which engineering so performed
by such person relates to the manufacture, sale or installation of the products of
such person . . . .”217 Engineering that is “incidental” to, or “relates” to, the
manufacture of a product arguably is ancillary engineering, as Kolhoff asserted.
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Such statutes, however, make up only a portion of those states granting
an industrial exemption. Each state independently formulates its engineering
licensing laws; thus, the laws vary significantly from state to state as each takes
its own nuanced approach. The result is a hodgepodge of inconsistent laws.218 A
number of states do not have an industrial exemption at all,219 and a number of
others have exemptions so broad that they allow the unlicensed practice of any
kind of engineering—whether it is ancillary or primary—so long as it is done in
an industry context.220
Furthermore, even if the statutory language were uniform from state to
state, it would be subject to the interpretations of each state’s licensing
authorities and to the inconsistencies of enforcement. Each state has virtually
unfettered control of how to prosecute its laws. What constitutes incidental
engineering is in the eyes of the enforcer. With statutes full of ambiguities and
vague language requiring interpretation and as personalities and local cultures
affect attitudes, enforcement varies widely from state to state, as acknowledged
by a task force constituted by the National Council of Examiners of Engineering
and Surveying: “Jurisdictions are not necessarily enforcing licensure in
categories that are not exempt . . . .”221 Missouri’s licensing board candidly
acknowledged that, although it believed Missouri statutes required professors of
graduate level engineering courses to be licensed, it only “encouraged
compliance but does not enforce.”222 As agencies of the administrative state,

Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE § 4733.18(B)(2) (2014); and Texas, TEX. OCC. CODE § 1001.057(a)(2)
(2013).
218 Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis made this much-repeated observation in his dissent in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 386-87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting): “It is one
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rest of the country.” Id. Engineering societies have discovered the task of drawing general
conclusions about the industrial exemption is daunting because of each state’s nuanced approach.
The National Council of Examiners of Engineering and Surveying decided to “poll” the various
state licensing boards rather than attempt to wade through the statutes themselves. Industrial
Exemption Task Force, IEEE-USE TODAY’S ENG’R 153-54, http://www.todaysengineer.org/2013/
Jul/files/Industrial-Exemption-TF-report-2013.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2014).
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licensing boards typically have much discretion to allow full measure of the
board’s expertise.223
Contrary to Kolhoff’s view, unlicensed engineers daily engage in
primary and ancillary engineering in this country. They do so either because
they work in a state whose exemption is so broadly worded that it applies the
exemption to primary engineering work, or because the board in the state
declines to expend limited enforcement resources pursuing actions based on the
often fine-haired distinctions between primary and ancillary engineering.
Consider, for example, the exemption in force in Colorado, which exempts
“[p]artnerships, professional associations, joint stock companies, limited liability
companies, or corporations, or the employees of any such organizations, who
perform engineering services for themselves or their affiliates . . . .”224 This
statute does not exempt only ancillary engineering. It does not restrain the nature
of engineering practiced at all, other than to require that the engineering be done
for the partnership, professional association, joint stock company, limited
liability company, or corporation. It does not even require the organization that
employs the person be an industrial firm or manufacturer. The door to
unlicensed practice of engineering could not be open much wider.225 Surely, such
a situation poses significant threats to the public. For example, the engineering
of the faulty switches besetting General Motors in recent days were engineered
for GM by Delphi Mechatronics before GM engineers brought the matter inhouse and assumed responsibility for the switches.226 Whether the work was
ancillary or primary to GM’s manufacturing of automobiles is open to
interpretation. Either way, the work reportedly has resulted in the deaths of at
least twelve persons in automobile crashes.227 Even if designing the switches

223 See generally Charles H. Koch, Jr., Issues in Administrative Law: Judicial Review of
Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469 (1986) (discussing the broad scope of
administrative agencies’ enforcement discretion).
224 COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-25-103(1)(c) (2014) (emphasis added).
225 Colorado’s statute is not an aberration. In addition to the examples set out supra note 220,
consider Delaware’s statute, which exempts “engineering services performed by an employee of a
firm or corporation that does not offer professional engineering services to the general public.”
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2803(25) (2014); and Mississippi’s statute exempting “[t]he performance
of engineering services by any regular full-time employee of a manufacturing, research and
development, railroad, or other industrial corporation . . . .” MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-13-41(1)(d)
(2014).
226 Mike Colias & Nick Bunkley, ‘Cardinal Sin’: Former GM Engineers Say Quiet ’06 Redesign of
Faulty Ignition Switch was a Major Violation of Protocol, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Mar. 24, 2014),
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were deemed primary engineering, unlicensed persons could do the work
lawfully under Michigan’s exemption.228
Kolhoff, however, added a qualifier to his contention. He asserted that
the work of engineers working in industry did not pose “a threat for which there
is inadequate legal protection[.]”229 The protections he mentioned were “product
safety legislation” and “legal precedents of the manufacturer’s responsibility for
the quality and safety . . . .”230
Kolhoff failed to note that these “protections” all kick in after a product
has killed or maimed. Tort liability can make a tortfeasor pay a widow for her
husband’s wrongful death, but surely most widows would opt for protection that
attempts to avoid their husbands’ being killed by a product in the first place.
Product safety legislation can require industry to take remedial action to correct
its dangerous wares, but they typically apply after a product has already done its
killing or maiming. Such laws are not nearly as effective in preventing mishaps
as a reasonably prudent engineer would be in designing safety into a product at
the outset.
Moreover, Kolhoff’s reliance on product safety legislation was
misplaced. His argument was published in 1983. Since then, with the
protections of the laws noted by Kolhoff in place, the mayhem caused by
consumer products has worsened. During 2010, more than 38.5 million
Americans sought medical attention for injuries related to consumer products, up
from the more than 28 million who received medical treatment for such injuries
in 1985.231 Consumer advocate Ralph Nader predicted that threats posed by “the
products and processes of technology”232 would significantly tarnish engineers’
reputations “as the realization spreads of what the engineer can do in contrast to
what he does do to diminish the hazards to life and limb . . . .”233
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Although unlicensed engineers working in industry undoubtedly strive to
apply the same engineering principles as licensed engineers do, Nader suggested
that the industrial context creates a major handicap for those engineers working
under an exemption. It deprives them of independence. He noted that they are
often co-opted by “corporate culture.”234 Engineers working in this context, he
said, struggle to “live professional lives of their own in technical societies and
public forums apart from their employee status and without fear of overt or
covert retaliation whether in the form of dismissal, demotion, or the freezing of
promotion.”235
B. Real Life for Engineers Working in Industry: The Challenger Saga
Supporting Nader’s point is the remarkable story of the losing battle
Morton-Thiokol engineers waged in an attempt to avert the space shuttle
Challenger tragedy in 1986. Six astronauts and a school teacher perished in the
disaster, and it nearly killed America’s space program.
Thiokol’s rocket motor engineers put their jobs on the line in trying to
stand up against NASA and Thiokol’s management. On the eve of the
Challenger’s launch, Thiokol’s vice president of engineering Bob Lund, acting
on the data and conclusions prepared by the company’s engineers, recommended
that the Challenger’s launch be delayed because of the frigid temperatures
forecasted and the debilitating effect the extreme cold would have on the solid
rocket motor seals.236
Two of the engineers, Roger Boisjoly and Arnie Thompson, had sounded
an alarm when they learned that forecasts called for overnight temperatures as
low as eighteen degrees Fahrenheit at Cape Canaveral, and launch-time
temperatures were expected to be below thirty degrees.237 The lowest
temperature in which NASA had launched a shuttle was fifty-three degrees, and
Thiokol engineers had discovered evidence that during that flight the O-rings
sealing the rocket motors had allowed hot gases to escape the motors’ casings.238
Previous testing had confirmed that low temperatures negatively affected the Orings’ function. Boisjoly had written memos the previous year warning that Oring failure could allow gas flumes to escape and set off an explosion in the
shuttle’s external tank.239
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A week before the Thiokol engineers’ recommendation, NASA had
stunned Thiokol management with an announcement that it was proceeding with
serious consideration of transferring the job of disassembling the shuttle’s solid
rocket boosters after each flight to one of Thiokol’s competitors.240 Thiokol
management became quite apprehensive that such a move might be followed by
Thiokol’s losing its contract to assemble the booster segments before each flight
in the vehicle assembly building at Cape Canaveral.241 And to add to Thiokol’s
pressures, NASA had been making noise that, because of future plans to increase
shuttle launches to two a month, it was considering terminating its contract with
Thiokol as the sole source for the shuttle’s rocket motors.242 Alan McDonald,
Thiokol’s senior management liaison for solid rocket boosters, described the
pressure on Thiokol managers: “It was not the perfect situation for levelheaded
engineering thinking to trump vital business concerns inside Morton Thiokol
management, not with billions of dollars at stake.”243 He added that, had
“Thiokol management not feared that [solid rocket booster] activities might be
second-sourced to our competitors, a key domino leading to the Challenger
disaster of January 28, 1986, might never have fallen.”244
The domino fell the night before the Challenger’s launch. During a
three-way teleconference among Thiokol engineers in Brigham City, Utah, with
NASA shuttle flight engineers and managers at Kennedy Space Center in Cape
Canaveral, Florida, and Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama,
Thiokol engineers stunned NASA officials with its recommendation not to
launch the Challenger the next morning.245 This was not welcomed news for
NASA, which earlier that day had scrubbed the Challenger’s scheduled launch
for the sixth time in more than a month.246
Earlier on the afternoon of January 27, 1986, Thiokol engineers in Utah
began working with Bob Lund, Thiokol’s vice president in charge of
engineering, after getting confirmation of weather conditions at Cape
Canaveral.247 The Thiokol engineers participated in a preliminary teleconference
with NASA managers during the early evening. They expressed their concerns
and declared that they believed that the launch should be delayed.248 When
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MCDONALD & HANSEN, supra note 236, at 81-83.

241 Id.
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Id. at 10.
Id. at 83.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 96.
246 Id. at 92-93. NASA put the flight off on January 27 because of high winds, which moved in
during a long delay caused by technicians’ being unable to remove a bolt preventing the closing of
the crew compartment’s hatch. Id. at 95-96.
247 Id. at 93-97.
248 Id. at 97-106. Judson Lovingood, NASA’s deputy manager of the Shuttle Projects Office at
Marshall Space Flight Center understood the Thiokol engineers to be making a definitive
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Thiokol’s engineers teleconferenced later that night with a full contingency of
NASA managers and engineers, Lund unequivocally recommended against
launching if the temperature was below fifty-three degrees Fahrenheit.249
Thiokol’s engineers unanimously supported the recommendation, and no one at
Thiokol made any comment favoring launch.250
NASA’s reaction surprised Thiokol. Lawrence Mulloy, head of NASA’s
rocket booster program at Marshall, declared that he could not accept the
rationale for the recommendation—that he needed more quantitative data—and
George Hardy, deputy director of science and engineering at Marshall, said he
was “appalled” by it.251 Mulloy asked pointedly, “Thiokol, when do you want me
to launch, next April?”252 After NASA’s Stanley Reinartz253 expressed confusion
concerning specifications that seemed to suggest that the O-rings were qualified
to function as low as forty degrees Fahrenheit, Mulloy criticized Thiokol’s data
as “inconclusive.”254
Thiokol engineers understood NASA to be asking them to prove
quantitatively that the O-rings were likely to fail.255 They did not believe that
they could do that. Joe Kilminster, Thiokol’s vice president of space booster
programs, then tipped the domino that would seal the fate of the Challenger
crew. He asked for five minutes for Thiokol engineers to caucus for purposes of
re-evaluating the data.256
The account of the remarkable half-hour standoff between engineering
and management occurring after Kilminster hit the mute button in Brigham City
validates Nader’s warning to engineers working in industry: that they should
expect times when management, for business reasons, will be dismissive of their
sound engineering judgment.257 Such incidents seem inevitable.
In the room were about ten Thiokol engineers and management
executives, Jerry Mason, senior vice president of Thiokol’s Wasatch Operations,
and Cal Wiggins, vice president and general manager of Thiokol’s space
division.258 The story of the intense debate is best told by an engineer who was

recommending at that point that the launch be delayed. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE
SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, Vol. I, at 87 (1986) [hereinafter
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT]. Stanley Reinartz, chief of Marshall’s Shuttle Projects Office,
understood the engineers to be merely expressing concerns that could lead to a delay in the launch.
Id.
249 MCDONALD & HANSEN, supra note 236, at 103-04.
250 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 248, at 90.
251 MCDONALD & HANSEN, supra note 236, at 104
252 Id.
253 See supra text accompanying note 248.
254 MCDONALD & HANSEN, supra note 236, at 104.
255 Id. at 106.
256 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 248, at 90.
257 Nader, supra note 103, at 280-81.
258 MCDONALD & HANSEN, supra note 236, at 111.
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there and who lived the agony of having management refuse to listen to his
warnings of dire consequences. In his testimony before the President’s
Commission investigating the Challenger disaster, Roger Boisjoly recalled:
[T]he caucus started by Mr. Mason stating a management decision was
necessary. Those of us who opposed the launch continued to speak out,
and I am specifically speaking of Mr. Thompson and myself because in
my recollection he and I were the only ones that vigorously continued
to oppose the launch. And we were attempting to go back and rereview
and try to make clear what we were trying to get across, and we
couldn’t understand why it was going to be reversed. So we spoke out
and tried to explain once again the effects of low temperature. Arnie
actually got up from his position which was down the table, and walked
up the table and put a quarter pad down in front of the table, in front of
the management folks, and tried to sketch out once again what his
concern was with the joint [sealed by the O-rings], and when he
realized he wasn’t getting through, he just stopped.
I tried one more time with the photos. I grabbed the photos,
and I went up and discussed the photos once again and tried to make
the point that it was my opinion from actual observations that
temperature was indeed a discriminator and we should not ignore the
physical evidence that we had observed.
And again, I brought up the point that [an earlier shuttle flight
in January 1985] had a 110 degree arc of black grease while [a flight in
October 1985] had a relatively different amount, which was less and
wasn’t quite as black. I also stopped when it was apparent that I
couldn’t get anybody to listen.259

Boisjoly then responded to a question from the commission as to whether
any Thiokol engineers spoke up in favor of launching:
No, sir. No one said anything, in my recollection, nobody said
a word. It was then being discussed amongst the management folks.
After Arnie and I had our last say, Mr. Mason said we have to make a
management decision . . . . From this point on, management
formulated the points to base their decision on. There was never one
comment in favor, as I have said, of launching by any engineer or other
nonmanagement person in the room before or after the caucus. I was
not even asked to participate in giving any input to the final decision
charts [being prepared to support a recommendation to launch].
I went back on the [teleconference network] with the final
charts or final chart, which was the rationale for launching, and that
was presented by Mr. Kilminster. It was hand written on a notepad . . .
. I did not agree with some of the statements that were being made to

259 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT,

supra note 248, at 92.
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support the decision. I was never asked nor polled, and it was clearly a
management decision from that point.260

Boisjoly also told the commissioners that what occurred that night was not the
first time he had endured such a confrontation with management. He said that he
experienced it before while working for other companies.261
After Thompson and Boisjoly finished making their arguments, Mason
polled the room, “Am I the only one who wants to fly?”262 The engineers did not
respond.263 Wiggins and Kilminster indicated that they were ready to reverse
Thiokol’s recommendation.264 He then turned to Lund, the company’s vice
president of engineering, who had not responded.265 Lund’s support would be
important to NASA because he had made the original recommendation on the
basis of engineering. Mason pressed him: “‘We’re just going over and over the
same information, . . . and it’s time for a decision.’ When Lund still [did not
respond], Mason said, ‘It’s time for you, Bob, to take off your engineering hat
and put on your management hat.’”266 With that, Lund relented.267
When the teleconference resumed, Kilminster announced that Thiokol,
after reconsidering the data, was recommending that the launch proceed.268
NASA asked Kilminster to put his recommendation in writing.269 He agreed to
do so.270 The next morning, on January 28, at 11:38, while the temperature was
thirty-six degrees Fahrenheit, NASA launched.271 The Challenger rose to about
50,000 feet and exploded a mere seventy-three seconds into its flight.272
Experts later determined that, just as Boisjoly had warned,273 superhot
gasses had blown by an O-ring stiffed by frigid temperatures.274 Escaping from a
rocket motor, a plume of hot gases ignited an explosion in the Challenger’s large
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Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 93.
262 MCDONALD & HANSEN, supra note 236, at 111-12.
263 Id. at 112.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 248, at 96.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 MCDONALD & HANSEN, supra note 236, at 116-19.
272 See id. at 121-22.
273 Actually, Boisjoly expected the O-rings to fail on the launch pad.
Roger Boisjoly, THE
TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 7, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/scienceobituaries/9067491/Roger-Boisjoly.html. Fear kept him from watching television broadcasts of the
launch, but when the “Challenger cleared the launch tower, a [friend] whispered to him, ‘We just
dodged a bullet.’” Id. Their relief was crushed seconds later by the explosion. Id.
274 MCDONALD & HANSEN, supra note 236, at 2.
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external tank tied to the orbiter’s belly.275 The tank was filled with 1.6 million
pounds of liquid hydrogen and oxygen.276
Roger Boisjoly did all anyone could reasonably expect him to do to
prevent the disaster. Although he was not licensed at the time,277 he did
everything that the public would expect of a professional engineer. He put the
public’s interests ahead of his own. He did what men facing such situations
rarely do: He laid his job and self-interest on the line and stood up for the seven
individuals whose space craft would be propelled by his company’s rocket
motors the next day.
C. What Difference Would a License Have Made?
During such times as Roger Boisjoly faced, about the most significant
effect a professional license can have is to serve as an outside influence—a
reminder to the professional that his or her duties extend far beyond his or her
employer’s interests to include the public’s interest.278 It serves as a sort of
brooding omnipresence279 to prick the professional’s conscience during such

275

Id.

276 Id. at

121.
Boisjoly was granted three professional engineering licenses after the Challenger incident: in
Florida (1989), Arizona (1990), and Utah (1994). See Licensee Search,” FLA. DEP’T OF BUS. &
PROF’L REGULATION, http://www.fbpe.org/licensure/licensee-search (follow “licensee search”
hyperlink; then select “Search by Name” and click “Search” button; then search “Roger Boisjoly”;
then click on “Boisjoly, Roger M.” hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 28, 2014); Search for Professional
STATE
BD.
OF
TECHNICAL
REGISTRATION,
Registrants,
ARIZ.
http://directorybtr.az.gov/listings/professional_registrant2.asp (search “Boisjoly” then click “Find”)
(last visited Dec. 28, 2014); License Lookup & Verification System, Utah Div. Occupational &
Prof’l Licensing, https://secure.utah.gov/llv/search/index.html (search “Roger Boisjoly”; then select
License # 176639-2202) (last visited Dec. 28, 2014); Roger Boisjoly Curriculum Vitae, ONLINE
ETHICS CTR. FOR ENG’G. & SCI., http://www.onlineethics.org/cms/12717.aspx (last visited Dec. 28,
2014).
278 UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1-401(2) (West 2014) sets out the grounds for disciplining an engineer’s
license in Utah: “(a) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unprofessional conduct, as defined by
statute or rule under this title; (b) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unlawful conduct as
defined by statute under this title; (c) the applicant or licensee has been determined to be mentally
incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction; or (d) the applicant or licensee is unable to
practice the occupation or profession with reasonable skill and safety because of illness,
drunkenness, excessive use of drugs, narcotics, chemicals, or other type of material, or as a result of
a mental or physical condition, when the condition demonstrates a threat or potential threat to the
public health, safety, or welfare.” The Utah licensing board has promulgated a regulation that
defines “unprofessional conduct” by listing twenty-six acts that constitute unprofessional conduct.
UTAH ADMIN. CODE. r. 156-22-502 (2014).
279 This is a phrase crafted by Oliver Wendell Holmes in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the
sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified; although
some decisions with which I have disagreed seem to me to have forgotten the fact.”).
277
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ethical dilemmas such as Boisjoly and the other Thiokol engineers faced. It is
what Martin Goland had in mind when he admonished that, for an engineer to
“use his professional talents in a cause he believes to be unworthy is a violation
of a sacred social trust.”280
A license surely would not have made Boisjoly more zealous and
passionate that night in Brigham City. Even without a license, he seemed to be
spurred by an brooding omnipresence from another source. Indeed, in an account
of his life, a British newspaper told of an encounter he had experienced about a
dozen years before the Challenger ordeal:
In 1974 [Boisjoly] was working with the Rockwell Corporation on
stress analysis for the Shuttle crew compartment when he noticed that a
fellow worker was increasingly distressed. It turned out that the
colleague had previously worked on the design of the DC-10 cargo
door, and had argued for changes to improve it. The man had not
insisted, however, and in March 1974 a DC-10 cargo hatch failed near
Paris, resulting in the deaths of 346 people.281

The Supreme Court of Illinois recognized in Balla v. Gambro, Inc.,282
that professional licenses certainly can have the effect of a brooding
omnipresence. Like the Challenger incident, the Balla case involved a
showdown between a professional, an attorney named Roger Balla, and
management, Gambro’s president.283 Balla had learned that Gambro was
planning to sell equipment in violation of federal regulations.284 Balla told
Gambro’s president that he would do all he could to block the sale.285 The
company fired him a month later, and he sued the company for retaliatory
discharge.286
But the Balla court refused to extend the tort’s protection to Balla.287 The
court reasoned that the tort’s purpose was to provide a remedy for an employee
who been wronged after standing up to protect the public, such as a

280 Martin Goland, Can Professionalism Be Attained with in the Corporate Structure?,
ENGINEERING PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICS 285, 285 (James H. Schaub et al. eds., 1983).
281 Roger Boisjoly: Rocket Engineer Whose Warnings of Catastrophe on the Eve of the Challenger
Disaster Went Unheeded, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 8, 2012, at 29, available at 2012
WLNR 2705744.
282 Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991).
283 Id. at 105.
284 Id. at 106.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 107.
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whistleblower might do.288 Although that certainly described Balla, the court
concluded that Balla, as a lawyer, already had a duty to protect the public by
reporting his employer’s illegal acts.289 Even if it meant losing his job, Balla’s
law license and the rules of professional conduct it imposed on him obligated
him to be a whistleblower.290 Because of his duty as a lawyer, the court reasoned,
“the public policy . . . of protecting the lives and property of citizens, is
adequately safeguarded without extending the tort . . . .”291
Regardless of the correctness of the Balla court’s legal reasoning, the
court made an important point about what it means to be a professional. As a
professional, Balla had a duty to exert control over matters of law at Gambro. In
his dispute with management over selling the illegal equipment, Balla, as the
lawyer, could not defer the decision to management. He could not take off his
lawyer hat to put on a management hat. A nonprofessional employee at
Gambro—say a secretary or clerk—had no such obligation; thus, such an
employee needed the tort’s special protection should he or she decide to “blow
the whistle” on Gambro.
The Balla court was speaking of independent judgment and control.
Indeed, these are essential indicia of professionalism.292 The distinctive mark of a
professional is the practitioner’s exercise of independent judgment and exertion
of control over the subject matter within the professional’s expertise.
Independent judgment and control require discretion, and a professional can
expect management to resist such discretion. Management tends to loath
discretion by a firm’s employees. For a business, employee discretion breeds
inefficiency, which is an enemy of profit.293
The medical profession illustrates the point. To effectuate cost savings,
physicians are being pushed into large business entities, such as health
maintenance organizations (HMO). To remain a member of the HMO, a
physician must conform to the HMO’s constraints. The less discretion a
physician exercises, the more “efficient” and profitable his or her services
become for the HMO. With such loss of control ever increasing in medicine, the
medical profession, once featuring autonomous decision-making, appears to be in
a state of decline. Indeed, in a review of Elliott Krause’s work on professions,294
The Economist chronicled the decline in medicine’s status as a profession:

288 Id. at 107-08 (“‘[T]here is no public policy more important or more fundamental than the one
favoring the effective protection of the lives and property of citizens.’” (quoting Palmateer v. Inter’l
Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ill. 1981)).
289 Id. at 108-09.
290 Id. at 108.
291 Id.
292 See ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONALISM, THE THIRD LOGIC 17 (2001).
293 See Id. at 3.
294 KRAUSE, supra note 22.
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American doctors[’] . . . power in the 1940s and 1950s was
almost total. Membership of the American Medical Association rose to
nearly 75% of all doctors in the 1960s. Through its state associations,
the AMA controlled entry into the profession and dominated cognate
professions like nursing, X-ray technology and occupational therapy.
The AMA ensured that the proportion of doctors in the population
remained almost static between the early 1930s and the early 1960s.
Most doctors remained in their own office practices or operated in
hospitals that they controlled. All efforts to introduce national health
insurance—which posed a threat to doctors’ fees as well as their
autonomy—were successfully resisted.
Those were the days, now long gone. By 1990 less than half
of America’s doctors belonged to the AMA. The profession as a whole
is increasingly fragmented among specialised associations and between
practitioners and academics. Restrictions on entry into the profession
collapsed, and the proportion of doctors in the population nearly
doubled from 151 per 100,000 in 1970 to nearly 300 by 1990. More
than half of all American doctors, far from being free-standing
professionals, are now salaried employees. Doctors can no longer
control the previously subordinate medical professions. They can no
longer control even their own places of work, with more and more
decisions—even quasi-medical decisions—being taken by management
boards and professional administrators. Worst of all, the AMA a
generation ago proved unable to resist the introduction of schemes like
Medicare and Medicaid.295

Medicine’s move away from autonomy—loss of control—and towards the
subservience of salaried positions is a clear indicator of a decline in the
profession.
In this same vein, engineering’s industrial exemption belies
professionalism. Its distinctive feature is subservience, not control. Because an
engineer is employed by an entity on whom liability will rest, the demands of
professionalism such as Roger Balla assumed in his job at Gambro296 are lifted
from his or her shoulders. Moreover, as Edwin Layton observed, engineers’
challenge when working in corporate America is to achieve any amount of moral
autonomy and social responsibility because “[e]mployers have been unwilling to
grant autonomy to their employees, even in principle. They have assumed that
the engineer, like any other employee, should take orders.”297

295
Just Another Way to Make a Living, ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 1998,
http://www.economist.com/node/370941 (emphasis added). See KRAUSE, supra note 22, at 38-44.
296 Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 108-10.
297 LAYTON, supra note 19, at 5.
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The industrial exemption is a natural outgrowth of a profession, which,
from the outset, has been closely allied with the industrial firms it serves. Since
the beginning, engineering’s primary role has been to answer industry’s call for
expertise. Industry is, and always has been, engineering’s closest associate and
ally. Engineers have always depended on industry and its capital298 as much as
industry has depended on engineers’ know-how.299
This symbiotic partnership has forged a strong alliance in which, as often
as not, industry dominates and even controls engineering. Elliott Krause has
bluntly concluded that “there never has been much question about the status of
American engineering: engineers were and are the middle-level employees of
capitalism.”300
That night in Brigham City, Jerry Mason understood the nature of
engineering’s relation to corporate management when he told Thiokol’s head
engineer that it was time for him “to take off [his] engineering hat.”301 Mason
knew that management was in charge, not engineering. He knew that he, as the
head manager in the room, could insist that his engineers yield their independent
engineering judgments and join in making a business decision about an
engineering problem.
IV. WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE INDUSTRIAL EXEMPTION?
At the beginning of the 21st Century, engineering stands far from
achieving recognition as a true profession. Informed engineers admit it. As
Stephen J. Ressler acknowledges, “[e]ngineering is regarded as an inherently
weak profession because of the corporate setting in which engineering work is
typically performed.”302
And informed engineers have understood their
profession’s plight for a long time. In 1910, George Swain, professor of civil
engineering at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, acknowledged that “many
well informed people deny that engineering is a profession at all . . . .”303 Elliott
Krause’s assessment is more candid:

298 ABBOTT,

supra note 21, at 156.
LAYTON, supra note 19, at 2 (“Where large investments are at stake, the engineer can serve a
useful function in eliminating guesswork and minimizing risks. Technically, large works are more
likely to involve complexities than are small ones; and the larger the project, the more likely it is
that such difficulties will transcend the capabilities of artisans and businessmen.”).
300 KRAUSE, supra note 22, at 60.
301 MCDONALD & HANSEN, supra note 236, at 112.
302 Stephen J. Ressler, Sociology of Professions: Application to the Civil Engineering “Raise the
Bar” Initiative, J. PROF. ISSUES IN ENGINEERING EDUC. & PRAC., July 2011, at 151, 155 (citation
omitted).
303 George F. Swain, Engineering as a Profession and Its Relation to the American Association for
the Advancement of Science, 31 SCIENCE 81, 81 (1910).
299
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[E]ngineering in the United States is a very poorly organized, middlelevel employee group, with a series of scientific societies for each
specialty, usually run by capitalist engineers-turned-managers.
Production and development are controlled by the corporations, with a
high proportion of engineers sharing the corporate values, the loose
supervision of middle-level employees, and the possibility of
promotion at least into technical group management. With practically
no action as a group across work settings, engineers are an example of
a group that has never had [the power of a profession].304

A. The Industrial Exemption is Dangerous to Engineering
The obvious reason states are willing to excuse engineers working in
industry from licensure does not appear to be, as Kolhoff believed,305 that these
engineers do only ancillary engineering and thus do not pose much of a threat to
the public. The real reason for the industrial exemption is far more likely that the
states have perceived that engineers working in industry are not in charge. The
law has always preferred to pin responsibility on the person in charge.306
The industrial exemption’s perversion is that, in lifting responsibility
from the engineer’s shoulders and putting it on management, it necessarily gives
management claim of control over the engineering work. The untenable result is
that a person who may or may not understand engineering has control over
engineering work—what the work is to be and who is to perform it. Under the
exemption, management is free to assign engineering work to any of its
employees (even those not trained in engineering), and it is free to accord the title
engineer to any employee without consideration of the employee’s credentials.307
An engineer having earned a graduate degree may occupy a cubicle next to a
person who, although titled “engineer,” has not attained even a bachelor’s
degree.308

304 KRAUSE,

supra note 22, at 67.
See supra notes 208-09, 211-215 and accompany text.
306 See, e.g., Brian A. Melhus, Note, Control Person Liability: A Repudiation of Culpable
Participation, 37 J. CORP. L. 929 (2012).
307 Even though a wise manager can be expected to not assign significant work to an employee who
does not have the knowledge or skills to do the work, not every manager is wise. Scott Adams’
cartoon strip, “Dilbert,” amuses its audience daily with its reminder of the incompetent managers
nearly every worker has encountered at some point in his or her work experience. Laurence Peter
created much stir in 1969 with his theory that every employee tends to rise to his or her level of
incompetence. LAURENCE J. PETER & RAYMOND HULL, THE PETER PRINCIPLE (1969).
308 For example, Richard Masi posted this comment on an internet blog maintained by the National
Society of Professional Engineers: “I have a Bachelor’s [degree] in Biology and made it through
the Navy’s Nuke Engineering School (Mechanical) and passed the 6 hour NRRO review board to
earn my MM-3385. No degree is awarded for that but you get college credit towards a Bachelor’s
in Nuke Engineering Technology at many colleges. Nevertheless at my job[,] which I have had for
305
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Engineers working for business firms typically make their decisions as
members of a team whose specialized contributions are but one of several
disciplines involved in the project. As Martin Goland observed, “Team efforts
necessarily tend to subjugate the individual personality to the group median.”309
Licensed engineers bear personal responsibility for their work. Licensure ties
work product to the licensee. Unlicensed engineers working in industry under
the exemption do not bear such responsibility. Clearly, the public should expect
work for which an employee must assume personal responsibility to be done with
greater care than work done by one who knows that his or her employer will be
assuming responsibility for their work.310 Business managers can be expected to
make decisions based as much on cost, efficiency, and what customers want as
on what constitutes good engineering, even if ignoring sound engineering means
taking risks at the expense of the public’s best interests. Indeed, engineers have
“trade[d their] lower-level control of the daily work place for capitalist control of
ends, projects of work chosen, and even the decisions to hire and fire,” Krause
observes.311 “Engineering is not in control of the market for services, except for a
tiny group in consultant status . . . .”312
This picture simply does not depict a profession. It portrays instead
would-be professionals trapped in the world of business often unable to function
adequately as either a professional or business person. Way back in 1910,
George Swain captured the engineer’s plight: “Many people seem to think that
the engineer is neither a scientist nor a professional man, nor yet a business man
strictly speaking, but that he is something betwixt and between—some one to be
employed for certain technical work.”313
An engineer is more than a person employed for technical work.
Today’s engineers, by virtue of their education and esoteric knowledge, should

10 years, my title is now Regional Applications Engineer. Starting out fresh out of the Navy my
boss[,] a degreed engineer (but not a PE; he only passed the EIT exam)[,] only allowed me title of
Applications Specialist. A few years into it I threatened to quit unless [my] title was upgraded to
ASSOCIATE APPLICATIONS ENGINEER. He begrudgingly obliged. I didn’t even want a raise.
After all, by then I was designing advanced control systems for combustion and cryogenic systems
and thought the title warranted.” Richard Masi, The Industrial Exemption: What, if Anything,
Should the Profession Do?, NAT’L SOC’Y PROF. ENG’RS (March 03, 2010, 10:50 PM),
http://www.nspe.org/resources/blogs/pe-licensing-blog/industrial-exemption-what-if-anythingshould-profession-do?.
309 Goland, supra note 280, at 286.
310 This is not to say, of course, that the employee is not aware that faulty work will subject him or
her to disciplinary action, including termination. Often, however, this pressure has an effect
contrary to protecting the public. As the Challenger saga illustrates, the engineering employee
feels compelled to accede to management’s wishes to “cut corners.” See infra notes 304-305 and
accompanying text.
311 KRAUSE, supra note 22, at 60-61.
312 Id. at 61.
313 Swain, supra note 303, at 82.
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be taking their seat among the venerable professionals. Stopping them is
engineering’s long-standing partnership with industry. Undoubtedly the close
association between engineering and business is a fact of life that will not
change; both need each other.
But if engineering is ever to achieve profession status, it must find a way
to coexist with business without giving up its control of engineering work.
Change, if it is going to happen, will be initiated by engineers, not by industry.
Management has no incentive to change; it has firm control. Hence, the starting
point must be for engineers to find a way to wrest control of engineering from
management.
That will require a wholly different engineering culture—a complete
paradigm change—and complete paradigm changes are not easily accomplished.
They often require nothing short of revolution. In The Revolt of the Engineer,314
Edwin Layton sets out the long, complex battle that conservatives and reformers
have been waging since the turn of the 20th Century.315 Engineers seem to be at a
crucial point in a more than a hundred-year-long revolution to pull engineering
into the realm of professionalism.
B. The Industrial Exemption is Dangerous to the Public
Of course, no revolution can overcome complacency, and engineers
seem to have become quite complacent about their profession’s status. One of
the more alarming of Elliott Krause’s observations about engineers is the effect
that their working in the corporation context has had on their engineering
values.316 As should be expected, engineers working in industry must acculturate
to a large extent into the business world if they have hope for success. This, of
course, requires meshing engineering principles with a company’s overarching
goal of making a profit. The result, Krause says, is that engineers unavoidably
take on business values.317
Studies indicate that the vast majority of engineers perceive cost and
profit to be as important a factor in their engineering as the physical properties of
the components with which they work.318 But even beyond that, engineers have
allowed business values to dissuade them from being whistleblowers. “One thing
that engineers almost never do, given their values,” Krause says, “is to complain
when they work on projects that maximize profits through cutting back on

314 LAYTON,

supra note 19.
Layton acknowledges that that using “revolt” in the title of his book may have been a bit
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safety.”319 Engineers understand that their questioning safety aspects of a job can
put them in the express lane to unemployment.320
As an example of a bad business decision masquerading as an
engineering failure, the Challenger was not an aberrant occurrence. A list of
engineering catastrophes resulting from bad business decisions—often motivated
by “corner cutting” after a project falls behind schedule and goes over budget—
would be quite lengthy. One of the more recent ones was the 2010 explosion on
the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig forty miles off the coast of Louisiana in which
11 workers were killed and millions of gallons of oil spilled into the Gulf of
Mexico.321 A presidential commission investigating the disaster concluded that it
resulted from a series of blunders motivated by saving time and money.322 Every
year, hundreds of lawsuits are filed in which plaintiffs establish that
manufacturers consciously chose, for reasons of cost savings and market
considerations, to sell unsafe consumer products when they knew that safe
alternatives having little or no cost were available.323 One of the most notable
examples is Ford’s decision to take its Pinto model to market knowing that the
car’s design made it susceptible to explosions in the car’s gasoline tank during
rear-end collisions and that the problem could have been fixed for only $11 a
car.324
Putting employer’s interests ahead of the public’s is inconsistent with
professionalism, especially when doing so has the potential to kill or maim.
Simply, engineers who do not have the wherewithal to withstand management
pressure to set aside sound engineering in favor of saving time and money are not
professionals.
Hence, before changes necessary for advancing engineering can occur, a
change of attitude—undoubtedly nothing short of a revolution—must occur
among engineers. They must become aware of, and overthrow, the barriers that
have debilitated sound engineering. Severely handicapping engineers from
effectuating the needed change of attitude is a lack of unity and cohesiveness.
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Louis Gattschalk has noted that provocation does not create revolutions.
What gives rise to revolutions is solidarity in response to provocation:
The fact that I am discontent will not lead me to revolution unless I am
aware that quite a number of other people are equally discontented and
are likely to unite with me in the expression of my discontent. General
awareness of resentment against . . . provocations, together with the
provocations themselves, creates that kind of demand for change which
becomes effective in making revolutions.”325

Krause agrees, noting that engineers’ complacency has prevented
development of “oppositional group consciousness.”326 Most engineers do not
belong to an engineering society, and, if they do, they do not participate in it
much beyond attending a few social events.327 Without unity, the needed
revolution is not likely to endure.
C. Getting Rid of the Dangerous Industrial Exemption
Seemingly, one of the biggest barriers to engineering’s achieving
recognition as a bona fide profession is the industrial exemption. It necessarily
has meant that management, not engineers, is in control of much of the
engineering that occurs in the United States. It has significantly affected the
attitudes of engineers working in industry by allowing them to avoid
responsibility for their engineering and by requiring them to factor business
principles into their engineering judgment. The stark reality seems to be that, if
engineering is ever going to achieve recognition as a bona fide profession,
undoubtedly the catalyst will be a significant paring back, if not elimination, of
the industrial exemption.
The bad news, however, is that even if every state with some form of
industrial exemption were to amend their statutes to restrict the exemption’s
application to ancillary engineering, as Kolhoff advocated,328 it would not be
enough. Although Kolhoff is correct that the public should be adequately
protected if the work being done under the exemption is work that affects only
the firm for whom the engineer works, asking licensing boards to make and
enforce such fine-haired distinctions probably is asking for too much. Hence,
nothing short of outright elimination of the exemption will be enough.
Eliminating the exemption will not be easy. Industrial management has
good reason to want to retain the status quo; it is in control. For example, when
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attempts were made in Texas during 2003 to eliminate the exemption, industry
was effective in blocking the efforts.329 According to a NCEES task force, “The
industry lobbies, arguing economic development via contracted cheaper foreign
engineering services, were able to stop any action . . . .”330 Industry was able to
kill an effort in 1993 to pare back the exemption in Louisiana, even after much
effort was made to accommodate industrial interests.331
Engineers working in industry have little personal incentive for change.
They avoid the hassles of difficult examinations and times of apprenticeship
typically associated with licensing, and they enjoy the “safe harbor” of engaging
in an interesting job within an organization that assumes responsibility for their
work. Vestiges of engineers’ ambivalence toward licensing and siding with
industry remain. For example, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers
defends the exemption as a necessity for chemical businesses that typically
conduct interstate and international transactions. “Because of the lack of
uniformity in licensing laws and regulations between jurisdictions,” the
institute’s policy statement said, “the need for multiple licensures creates an
unnecessary burden on the engineer and company while providing no additional
benefit to the general health and welfare of the public.”332 The Public Affairs and
Outreach Sector of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers announced
similar views.333
Between such opposition by industry and engineers sympathetic to
industry, there does not appear to be much hope for eliminating the exemption.
There has been a bit of action, such as legislation introduced during the 2013-14
legislative session to the Pennsylvania General Assembly to eliminate the
exemption in Pennsylvania.334 Such legislation rarely gains traction, however,
and the Pennsylvania bill did not. Montana is the only state to throw out the
exemption, and that was more than thirty years ago.335

329

Industrial Exemption Task Force, supra note 218, at 155.

330 Id.
331 Id.

at 155-56.
Press Release, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Full Statement: AIChE and the
Industrial Exemption, April 2014 (May 7, 2014), http://www.aiche.org/about/press/releases/05-072014/full-statement-aiche-and-industrial-exemption-april-2014.
333 See Industrial Exemption, AM. SOC’Y OF MECH. ENG’RS, https://www.asme.org/wwwasmeorg/
media/ResourceFiles/AboutASME/Get%20Involved/Advocacy/Policy-Publications/PS14-07Industrial-Exemption-5-7-2014Statement.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2014). But see G. J. Kettler,
Against the Industry Exemption . . ., in ENGINEERING PROFESSIONALISM AND ETHICS 531, 533
(James A. Schaub et al. eds., 1983) (In rebuttal to similar arguments, Kettler noted, “The present
operations of many of the larger consulting companies cross multiple state lines successfully.
Common sense application of the laws and reciprocity provisions should solve most of the
problems including the transfer of engineers.”).
334 The measure is H.B. 1447 sponsored by Rep. Marc J. Gergely (D-35th District).
335 Schwartz, supra note 205.
332

2015]

ENIGMA OF ENGINEERING

685

Understanding that eliminating the exemption will require a revolution,
opponents of the exemption have called for a multi-faceted campaign. A task
force of the National Council of Examiners of Engineering and Surveying has
recommended beginning the campaign in the nation’s engineering classrooms.
The group calls for convincing engineering faculty to place more emphasis on
licensure, especially in engineering ethics courses, in hope of making licensure
seem like the natural next step for graduates of engineering school.336 The task
force also recommends working for modifications of reciprocity laws to facilitate
interstate practices and to heed the concerns expressed by the American Institute
of Chemical Engineers and others.337 The task force understands, too, that it must
find a way to “grandfather” the hundreds of thousands of unlicensed engineers
working in industry.338 Finally, the task force recommends an all-out public
relations campaign:
The public will need to understand why the elimination should be
undertaken, industry will need to understand why this change would be
advantageous to its long-term benefit, the profession will have to agree
to some form of initial compromise on some of the legs of licensure,
and the licensing boards will have to address comity.339

The last recommendation seems to be the most important one. So long
as the public fails to perceive the danger posed by the industrial exemption—its
facilitation of badly engineered industrial and manufactured products—
legislative complacency will surely continue. The public must be made aware
that engineering licensing laws rarely apply to the engineering work being done
in their states and that the overwhelming majority of engineering is being done
by unlicensed engineers. Legislators will be far more responsive to the outcries
of a public demanding explanation for why, if the legislatures deemed licensing
laws to be necessary for the public’s protection, they have seen fit to excuse all
but a few engineers from licensure.
V. CONCLUSION
The partnership of engineers and business is, for pragmatic reasons, here
to stay. It not only has been a symbiotic partnership—good for both engineers
and business—but it has been good for America. It has produced many
wonderful products that make life more enjoyable—the likes of smart cars, smart
phones, and smart TVs. Business has prospered as engineers have shown it how
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to make its products wonderful and smart, and business has rewarded engineers
for the favor.
But it has come at a high cost—for the public and for engineers.
Industry has demanded the likes of the industrial exemption and thereby gained
control of a majority of the engineering that occurs daily in the United States.
For the public, the price has been the loss of effectiveness of laws
intended to protect it from incompetent engineers whose work can kill or destroy.
Among the fallouts of the industrial exemption has been disaster—oil spills,
unsafe automobiles, and exploding spacecraft.
For engineers, the price may have been higher. It has lost its profession.
In exchange for the partnership’s rewards, engineers have acceded to business
managers’ penchant for asking their engineer employees to take off their
engineering hats and to fall into step.
The wisest man to have lived posed long ago a question that is apt for
engineers today. “What good will it be for someone to gain the whole world,”
Jesus asked, “yet forfeit their soul?”340 What good has it been for engineering to
have gained the bountiful rewards of business yet to have forfeited its profession?

340

Matthew 16:26 (NIV).

